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ISRAELI DEMOLITION OF 
PALESTINIAN HOUSES  
AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE: 
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW TO REGULATION 119 
Brian Farrell∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ince the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza, Israel has employed the practice of demolishing ci-
vilian houses as a response to offenses committed in these terri-
tories.  The use of demolitions as a punitive measure has gener-
ated considerable opposition in the international community 
and among legal experts.  These scholars argue that the demoli-
tion of houses is impermissible under existing international 
law. 
This article examines the practice of punitive housing demoli-
tion by Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza and draws 
conclusions as to its legality under international law.  Part II 
reviews the legal structure in the territories and explains the 
role of the Israeli courts.  Next, Part III discusses the policy be-
hind housing demolition, the justifications given for this meas-
ure, and the implementation of this practice.  Parts IV and V 
analyze the provisions of international law relating to housing 
demolition.  Part IV discusses human rights law, while Part V 
examines humanitarian law as contained in the Hague Regula-
tions and the Fourth Geneva Convention.  Both parts review 
the Israeli application of international law in the West Bank 
and Gaza before engaging in an independent analysis on their 
applicability.  Finally, the legality of housing demolition will be 
reviewed in light of the specific provisions of the Hague Regula-
tions and Fourth Geneva Convention. 
  
 ∗ The author is an attorney in private practice and an adjunct faculty 
member at St. Ambrose University, Davenport, Iowa.  He received his J.D. 
from the University of Iowa in 1998 and his LL.M. in International Human 
Rights Law from the National University of Ireland, Galway, in 2002. 
S 
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II. LEGAL REGIME IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 
Prior to World War I, the Ottoman Empire controlled the ter-
ritory of Palestine, which now consists of Israel and the Occu-
pied Territories.  Following the war and the fall of the Empire, 
the region was entrusted to Great Britain as a League of Na-
tions mandate.1  With this mandate set to expire, the British 
Government sought the counsel of the United Nations (“UN”), 
which recommended the partition of Palestine into separate 
Arab and Jewish states.2  Unable to reach a compromise satis-
factory to all of the parties, the British nonetheless announced 
their intention to terminate the mandate on May 14, 1948.3  In 
response, Jewish leaders immediately declared the establish-
ment of the State of Israel, and war ensued.4  Emerging victori-
ous from the war, Israel encompassed all of mandatory Pales-
tine, with the exception of the West Bank and Gaza, which were 
administered by Jordan and Egypt, respectively.5   
These 1948 borders left Israel vulnerable to attack.  As a re-
sult of an Egyptian military buildup on its border with Israel, in 
  
 1. See generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/leagcov.htm (last visited May 20, 2003) 
(establishing the mandate system).  The Covenant provided for “advanced 
nations” to administer territories controlled by the defeated powers at the end 
of World War I.  Id.  The mandate was to continue until such time as the terri-
tory could stand alone.   
 2. See G.A. Res. 181(II), UN GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131, UN Doc. A/519 
(1947).  The UN plan called for separate states bound together in an “eco-
nomic union.”  Id.  Britain had already expressed its support for “the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a homeland for the Jewish people.”  Ardi Imseis, On 
the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 65, 73 (2003) (citing Letter from Arthur James Balfour, For-
eign Secretary of Great Britain, to Lord Edmond de Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917).  
This letter, referred to as the Balfour Declaration, stated that this support 
was contingent on the understanding that “nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine.”  Id. at 73 n.74.   
 3. Emma Playfair, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 4 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992) [here-
inafter Playfair, Introduction]. 
 4. ANTHONY COON, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES: DEMOLITION AND DISPOSSESSION: THE DESTRUCTION OF 
PALESTINIAN HOMES 6 (1999).  
 5. Playfair, Introduction, supra note 3, at 4.  Jordan (then known as 
Transjordan) annexed the territory of the West Bank in 1950.  Id. 
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1967, war erupted between Israel and its neighbors.6  Israel 
once again emerged as the victor and its forces occupied both 
Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, at the con-
clusion of the brief Arab-Israeli War of 1967.7  The Israeli Knes-
set quickly took action to annex East Jerusalem into Israel.8 
The status of Gaza and the remainder of the West Bank has 
been, however, less clear.  Israel has denied that its control over 
these territories is an “occupation,” thus, denying that Jordan 
and Egypt had previously exercised sovereignty over them.9  
Rather, Israel has referred to its role in the West Bank and 
Gaza as an “administration” of these territories.10   
The volatile history of the West Bank and Gaza resulted in 
the existence of a rather complex legal regime.  In order to ana-
lyze the issues relating to housing demolition, this regime must 
be examined.   
A. Legislation and Administration 
The following Part will outline the legal system that has de-
veloped in the territories, with particular attention paid to Is-
rael’s legal predicates for the demolitions.  This part will first 
address the legislative and administrative regime that has de-
veloped in the West Bank and Gaza.  It will then examine the 
judicial system that has existed in the territories since 1967.  
Finally, it will take a close look at the validity of the British 
  
 6. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 4 (2002).   
 7. Id. at 5.   
 8. See generally Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) 
Law, 5727-1967, 1966–1967 S.H. 74, translated in 21 L.S.I. 75 (1966•67); Law 
and Administration Order (No. 1), 5727-1967, 1966–1967 Kovetz Ha Tak-
kanut (K.T.) (decreeing Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to be ap-
plicable in East Jerusalem).  The legality of this annexation under interna-
tional law was disputed by various persons and organizations, including the 
United Nations.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1426th mtg. 
at 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/252 (1968).  Israel subsequently enacted further legisla-
tion formally annexing Jerusalem.  See Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Is-
rael, 1979–80 S.H. 186, translated in 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979–80), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm. 
 9. See Playfair, Introduction, supra note 3, at 5. 
 10. See id.  The term “occupied” will be used in this article, consistent with 
its understood meaning in international law. See generally, id., Introduction, 
supra note 3, at 3–22. 
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Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 as a source of law 
today. 
The applicable law in the West Bank and Gaza from 1967 to 
present has been influenced by a number of sources each leav-
ing their imprint — local, imperial, and military law.  This sec-
tion will focus on the effect of each source on the Defense 
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 and the sources of legislation 
in the territories since 1967. 
1. Mandatory Palestine 
Pursuant to the League of Nations mandate, Great Britain 
was responsible for administering the territory of Palestine. 11  
The British administration in Palestine operated under the 
general structure and rules of the English legal system.  Even 
so, the system retained elements of Ottoman law and was also 
influenced by Islamic Shari’a.12   
During the mandate period, both Jewish and Arab elements 
within Palestine resisted British control.13  Much of the govern-
ment’s policy was, therefore, directed toward maintaining con-
trol and preserving civil order.  In 1921 and 1929, ordinances 
sought to alleviate Arab fears of losing property to recent Jew-
ish settlers in the region, while the laws made in 1936 were in 
direct response to revolutionary activity in Palestine.14 
By 1945, British officials faced growing opposition of the Jew-
ish underground movement.15  In direct response to this threat, 
the authorities adopted the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 
1945 pursuant to the Palestine (Defense) Order-in-Council of 
1937.16  The 1945 Regulations granted the government broad 
powers to crush paramilitary activity.17  Applicable throughout 
mandatory Palestine, authorities were given powers to suspend 
basic rights, order detention and deportation, limit free expres-
sion, association, and movement, order the forfeiture or demoli-
  
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. at 9.   
 13. Id. 
 14. George E. Bisharat, Land, Law and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occu-
pied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 500, & 515 (1994).   
 15. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121. 
 16. Id.   
 17. Diana Vincent-Daviss, The Occupied Territories and International 
Law: A Research Guide, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 575, 584 (1988–89).   
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tion of property, and establish military courts.18  These regula-
tions met with harsh criticism from Jewish political leaders and 
lawyers.19 
Prior to the expiration of the mandate, the Palestine (Revoca-
tions) Order-in-Council of 1948 was signed in London.20  This 
order-in-council acted to repeal the Palestine (Defense) Order-
in-Council of 1937 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to 
it, including the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.21  
The effective date of repeal was May 14, 1948, the final day of 
the mandate.22  The Palestine (Revocations) Order-in-Council of 
1948 was published in the Government Gazette in London.23  It 
was not, however, published in the official publication for the 
territory, the Palestine Gazette.24  Furthermore, the Defense 
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 were never explicitly repealed 
or modified by the Jordanian or Egyptian governments that 
administered the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, from the 
expiration of the mandate in 1948 until 1967,25 nor were hous-
ing demolitions carried out by these authorities.26 
  
 18. See generally Defense (Emergency) Regulations (1945), 1945 PALESTINE 
GAZETTE (no. 1442) (Supp. 2) 1055. 
 19. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121; EMMA PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, 
DEMOLITION AND SEALING OF HOUSES AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE IN THE ISRAELI-
OCCUPIED WEST BANK 10–11 (1987) [hereinafter PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ].  For ex-
ample, at a meeting of the Jewish Lawyers association in 1946, Dr. Yaacov 
Shimson Shapiro claimed the regulations were “unparalleled in any civilized 
country” and destroyed “the very foundations of justice in this land.”  SABRI 
JIRYIS, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 12 (1968). 
 20. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121. 
 21. See Palestine (Revocations) Order in Council (1948) S.I. 1948/1004, at 
1350–51. 
 22. Id.   
 23. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121.  In the view of the British Govern-
ment, this publication effectively repealed the Palestine (Defense) Order-in-
Council of 1937.  In a 1987 letter, the British Foreign Ministry confirmed that 
“in view of the Palestine (Revocations) Order in Council 1948, the Palestine 
(Defense) Order in Council 1937 and the Defense Regulations 1945 made un-
der it are, as a matter of English law, no longer in force.”  PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, 
supra note 19, at 33 (citing Letter from British Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, to al-Haq (Apr. 22, 1987)) 
 24. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121. 
 25. See ESTHER COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES: 1967–1982, at 94 (1985); Julius Stone, Behind the Cease-Fire 
Lines: Israel’s Administration in Gaza and the West Bank, in OF LAW AND 
MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HAIM H. COHN 79, 83 (Shlomo Shoham ed., 1971).  
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2. Occupation 
Upon entry into the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the Israeli 
Defense Forces issued proclamations regarding the governance 
of each area.27  The Proclamation of Assumption of Government 
by the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”) (“Proclamation No. 1”) 
stated that as a result of its effective possession of the areas, 
the IDF had assumed governance over those areas.28  This proc-
lamation formed the basis for the exercise of military govern-
ment in the West Bank and Gaza.  
The basis for Israeli administration and legislation in the 
West Bank and Gaza was the Proclamation Regarding Govern-
ment and Law (“Proclamation No. 2”) issued in each area.  Proc-
lamation No. 2 was issued by General Haim Herzog in each 
area on the day in which Israeli forces entered that area.29  Un-
der this proclamation, all legislative and administrative powers 
in areas controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces were concen-
trated in the hands of the military commander for each area.  It 
stated that: 
(a) All powers of government, legislation, appointment, and 
administration in relation to the area or its inhabitants shall 
  
An argument has been raised that certain provisions of the Regulations are 
inconsistent with the Jordanian Constitution of 1952 and were, therefore, 
implicitly repealed in the West Bank.  This argument was addressed and dis-
missed by the Israeli Supreme Court in Awwad v. Military Commander of 
Judea and Samaria, 33(3) P.D. 309 (1979), and Kawasme v. Minister of De-
fense, 35(1) P.D. 617 (1980).  A similar argument was raised in Gaza, based on 
the 1955 Basic Law for the Gaza Strip and the Constitution of Gaza of 1962, 
enacted by Egypt.  These arguments were also dismissed by the Israeli Su-
preme court in Maslam v. IDF Commander in Gaza, 45(3) P.D. 444 (1991).  
For a discussion of these cases, see KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 122–24.  See 
also Mazen Qupty, The Application of International Law in the Occupied Ter-
ritories as Reflected in the Judgments of the High Court of Justice in Israel, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 107 
(Emma Playfair ed., 1992) (discussing Qawassmeh v. Minister of Defense, 
35(1) P.D. 617 (1980), in which the Court questioned whether the Defense 
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 had, in fact, been repealed by the Jordanian 
Constitution). 
 26. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10. 
 27. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 92. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Mona Rishmawi, The Administration of the West Bank under Is-
raeli Rule, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES 271–72 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
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henceforth be vested in me alone and shall only be exercised 
by [the Military Governor] or by persons appointed by me for 
that purpose or acting on my behalf. 
(b) Without derogating from the generality of the foregoing it 
is hereby provided that any duty to consult, obtain consent 
and the like, prescribed in any law as a condition-precedent 
for legislation, enactment or appointment, or as a condition for 
the entry into force of any legislation or appointment — is 
hereby repealed.30 
Since 1967, Proclamation No. 2 has remained the source of all 
governmental power in the West Bank and Gaza.  These powers 
have been wide-ranging, and include control over real estate 
transaction,31 use of natural resources,32 issuance of professional 
licenses,33 travel,34 and all security matters.  Even when a civil-
ian administration was established in the West Bank in 1981, it 
was established by and under the authority of the area com-
mander.35  Thus, the military government retained final and 
absolute control over the territories. 
3. Preservation of Pre-Occupation Law 
One feature of the military government in the West Bank and 
Gaza was the retention of laws in effect prior to the occupation.  
This decision was evident from the 1967 proclamations estab-
lishing military rule.  Proclamation No. 2 stated that: 
  
 30. Proclamation on Government and Law (Area of West Bank) (Proclama-
tion No. 2) § 3 (June 7, 1967); Proclamation on Government and Law (Gaza 
Strip and Northern Sinai) (Proclamation No. 2) § 3 (June 8, 1967). 
 31. See Military Order 25 (1967), summarized in English and reprinted in 
JAMIL RABAH & NATASHA FAIRWEATHER, ISRAELI MILITARY ORDERS IN THE 
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN WEST BANK 4 (Jerusalem Media & Communication 
Centre, 1993).  The reader should note that the military orders have not been 
published in their entirety in English or Hebrew.  This is one of the reasons 
that there is frequent criticism about the transparency of the military gov-
ernment’s actions.  Thus the compellation by the Jerusalem Media & Com-
munication Centre is the best source of these orders in one volume.  See id. 
 32. See id.; Military Orders 58, 59, & 92, summarized in English and re-
printed in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 9, 14. 
 33. See id. Military Orders 260, 324, & 437, summarized in English and 
reprinted in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 34, 42, & 56.  
 34. See, e.g., Military Order 153, summarized in English and reprinted in 
RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 22. 
 35. See Rishmawi, supra note 29, at 275–81 (discussing establishment of a 
civilian administration in the West Bank in 1981). 
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The law which existed in the area on 7 June 1967 shall remain 
in force in so far as there is nothing therein repugnant to this 
Proclamation, any other Proclamation or Order which will be 
enacted by [the Military Governor], and subject to such modi-
fications as may result from the establishment of the rule of 
the I.D.F. in the area.36 
Thus, generally speaking, the laws that existed in the West 
Bank and Gaza prior to June 7, 1967, remained in force unless 
amended or repealed by the area commander.  An order prom-
ulgated shortly after the occupation began further stated that, 
to avoid doubt, any emergency regulations previously in place 
remained in force unless explicitly repealed.37  These orders left 
a system of Ottoman, British Mandatory, Jordanian, and mili-
tary law in the West Bank, and Ottoman, British Mandatory, 
Egyptian military, and Israeli military law in Gaza. 
Without analyzing the applicability or enforceability of inter-
national law at this point, it is important to note that the Israeli 
decision to respect prior law conformed to international legal 
norms.  According to the customary international law that was 
recognized at that time, “the law in force in occupied territory 
must be respected by the occupying power.”38  This principle is 
reflected in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 
of the Fourth Geneva Conventions.39 
B. Judicial System in the West Bank and Gaza 
The examination of housing demolition requires familiarity 
with the structure of the judicial system in the West Bank as 
well as Gaza and in Israel.  This section will first review the 
nature of the judicial system in the territories under military 
  
 36. Proclamation on Government and Law (Area of West Bank) (Proclama-
tion No. 2) § 2 (June 7, 1967); Proclamation on Government and Law (Gaza 
Strip and Northern Sinai) (Proclamation No. 2) § 2 (June 8, 1967). 
 37. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10.  See generally Military 
Order 224, art. 3 (1968), summarized in English and reprinted in RABAH & 
FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 30. 
 38. KRETZMER supra note 6, at 123. 
 39. See infra Part V.  See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, U.S.T.S. 539, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 
90 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 UNT.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth 
Geneva Convention]. 
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government.  It will then explain the role and availability of the 
Israeli Supreme Court in administration of these territories. 
1. Military Court System 
Area commanders established a system of military justice 
shortly after Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza.40  Proc-
lamation No. 3 implemented procedural and substantive law for 
“security offenses” and also created military courts with juris-
diction to try numerous matters.41  Preventative detention and 
warrantless searches were also authorized.42   
Along with the powers granted in earlier proclamations, this 
proclamation allowed area commanders to drastically alter the 
prior structure of the court system.  Criminal and civil matters 
previously tried in civil courts now fell under the concurrent 
jurisdiction of military courts.43  In addition, the area com-
mander assumed the power to appoint and dismiss judges and 
prosecutors, even in civil courts.44  Finally, the Court of Cass-
ation, the highest court of appeal under Jordanian rule, was 
dissolved by commanders in the West Bank.45 
2. Israeli Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court of Israel is highly regarded both in Israel 
and abroad.46  The Court fulfills two roles in the Israeli judicial 
system.  As in many national systems, the Supreme Court of 
Israel serves as the final court of appeals for decisions by Israeli 
district courts.47  The Court also sits as the High Court of Jus-
tice.48   
  
 40. Raja Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupa-
tion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES 152 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
 41. Id. at 153. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Military Order 129, summarized in English and reprinted in 
RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 19. 
 45. See Shehadeh, supra note 40, at 153. 
 46. See Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Terri-
tories, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (1994).   
 47. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 10. 
 48. Id. 
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The High Court of Justice is a feature of the English legal 
system.49  In this system, the High Court of Justice hears peti-
tions seeking review of government action.50  This second func-
tion was retained when the State of Israel was established upon 
expiration of the British Mandate.51  Thus, when sitting as the 
High Court of Justice, the Israeli Supreme Court adjudicates 
the legality of state actions and its constituent parts.52 
a. Jurisdiction 
The power to review government actions is defined by the pa-
rameters of the Israeli Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  This 
power does not necessarily give rise to the review of military 
actions outside the territory of the State of Israel.  Indeed, the 
courts of some nations have determined that they lack jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate petitions concerning the actions taken by 
military personnel outside their own sovereign territory.53 
The Israeli Supreme Court, however, has taken the view that 
it has jurisdiction to review acts of the military government in 
the occupied territories when sitting as the High Court of Jus-
tice.54  This authority flows from the Court’s in personam juris-
diction over individual members of the Israeli Defense Forces 
acting on behalf of the Israeli Government.55  Hence, the Court 
is competent to adjudicate petitions challenging these actions. 
However, this broad jurisdictional scope was not the product 
of judicial activism.  Rather, the scope resulted from a conscious 
decision by Israeli authorities not to contest petitions from the 
West Bank and Gaza on jurisdictional grounds.56  The govern-
ment stated that their reason for this policy was to prevent ar-
bitrary actions; however, other motives for this decision — such 
  
 49. Id. 
 50. See Simon, supra note 46, at 22. 
 51. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 10–11 (discussing the Courts Law, 
1957, which replaced the British Mandatory legislation). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See KRETZMER , supra note 6, at 19. 
 54. Id. at 13. 
 55. See Khelou v. Government of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169, 176 (1972), sum-
marized in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975). 
 56. See KRETZMER , supra note 6, at 20. 
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as subtly increasing the legitimacy of military rule — have been 
put forth as well.57 
The first reported case concerning the actions of military per-
sonnel in the West Bank and Gaza, decided in 1972, did not 
even address the issue of jurisdiction.58  The second decision 
merely stated that the government had not contested the issue 
in earlier cases.59  Jurisdiction had not been raised as an issue 
and would not, therefore, be ruled on.   
Within a year, the Court changed its approach.  Rather than 
passively ignoring the issue, the Court stated that it believed: 
[W]ithout ruling on the matter, that the jurisdiction exists on 
the personal level against functionaries in the military gov-
ernment who belong to the executive branch of the state, as 
“persons fulfilling public duties according to the law,” and who 
are subject to the review of this court under section 7(b)(2) of 
the Courts Law, 1957.60 
This view was eventually accepted as a binding rule.61  Thus, 
the Court deprived the government of the opportunity to change 
tactics and contest jurisdiction in a later case. 
Other potential challenges to the justiciability of issues aris-
ing from the occupation include issues regarding standing, the 
political question doctrine, and the act of state doctrine.62  These 
issues have not, however, been used to prevent non-Israelis in 
the territories from accessing the Israeli Supreme Court.63  The 
Court has, therefore, become an important forum for challenges 
to the actions of military authorities in the West Bank and 
Gaza.  
  
 57. Id. 
 58. See Christian Soc’y for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense, 26(1) 
P.D. 574 (1971), summarized in English in 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354  (1972).   
 59. See Electricity Corp. for Jerusalem District v. Minister of Defense, 
27(1) P.D. 124, 136 (1972), summarized in English in 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
381 (1975). 
 60. Khelou, 27(2) P.D. at 176. 
 61. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 20–21, citing Ja’amait Ascan v. IDF 
Commander in Judea and Samaria 37(4) P.D. 785, 809 (1982). 
 62. Challenges based on standing, the political question doctrine, and the 
act of state doctrine have not been used as a wholesale bar to petitions from 
the Occupied Territories.  For a discussion of these issues, see generally 
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 21–25. 
 63. Id. at 25. 
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b. Applicable Law 
Despite Israel’s initial plans to establish a constitution, one 
was never adopted.  In the absence of a written constitution, the 
British model of parliamentary supremacy is followed.64  While 
the Israeli Supreme Court may review the correctness of the 
actions of government officials, it cannot pass judgment on leg-
islation passed by the Knesset. Primary legislation is, therefore, 
the highest form of law.65 
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2, all legislative powers in the 
West Bank and Gaza are concentrated in the hands of the area 
commander.66  In an early case from the territories brought be-
fore the Israeli Supreme Court, the government argued that 
military orders should be treated as primary legislation and 
should therefore fall outside the purview of judicial review.67  
The Court rejected this argument, taking the view that military 
orders are a form of delegated, rather than primary, legisla-
tion.68  Additionally, the Court later held that as a part of the 
government administration, military commanders and their 
actions should be reviewed under Israeli administrative law.69 
As a national court, the Israeli Supreme Court applies Israeli 
law.  Any challenges brought before the Court must be based on 
principles recognized in the Israeli legal system.  Claims based 
on public international law can be adjudicated only if the prin-
ciples of international law relied upon are also a part of Israeli 
domestic law.70 
Under the English common law system, customary interna-
tional law is a part of domestic law to the extent that it does not 
conflict with parliamentary primary legislation.71  It can, there-
fore, be enforced in domestic courts.  On the other hand, con-
  
 64. See Simon, supra note 46, at 23. 
 65. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 21–25. 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 29–35. 
 67. See generally Hilu v. State of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169 (1972), summarized 
in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975) 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Abu Itta v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, 37(2) P.D. 197, 
230–31 (1981), summarized in English in 13 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 348 (1983). 
 70. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31. 
 71. See John Dugard, Enforcement of Human Rights in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES 461 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
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ventional international law, based on multilateral treaties, is 
not a part of domestic law unless expressly incorporated by par-
liament.72  As a result, conventional law is not enforceable in 
domestic courts without enabling legislation.  Thus, customary 
international law is applied and enforced by the courts of Israel 
and conventional international law is not. 
C. Status of Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 
The use of housing demolitions has been justified in Israeli 
law under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.73  
These regulations allow for wide-ranging and draconian secu-
rity measures that have been highly criticized.74  Although it 
has used these powers extensively, Israel has disclaimed re-
sponsibility for the continued use of the regulations.75  Rather, 
the state contended that the regulations remained in effect at 
the time the West Bank and Gaza were occupied, and it was 
thus bound to preserve them.76   
As provisions of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 
came to be used by the Israeli Defense Forces in the West Bank 
and Gaza, questions were raised concerning their continued 
validity.77  Several arguments were made that the regulations 
had been repealed prior to the entry of Israeli forces into the 
territories.78  If this was the case, Israel would be denied of its 
claim that it was bound to preserve the regulations.   
Since scholars have argued that Britain effectively repealed 
the regulations in the Palestine (Revocations) Order-in-Council 
of 1948.79  The Israeli Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
finding that the British Government’s failure to publish the 
revocation order in the official Palestine Gazette was fatal to 
the argument that the regulations had been repealed.80  The 
  
 72. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31. 
 73. See Simon, supra note 46, at 15. 
 74. Id. at 15–16. 
 75. Id. at 15. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 94. 
 78. Id. at 94–95. 
 79. See supra text accompanying notes 15–24 (discussing the revocation 
order). 
 80. See Na’azal v. IDF in Judea and Samaria, 39(3) P.D. 645, 652 (1986), 
summarized in English in 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 329 (1986). 
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Court relied on the principle that “hidden laws” have no valid-
ity; therefore, the revocation never took effect.81   
Scholars also argue that Jordan repealed the Defense (Emer-
gency) Regulations of 1945 in the West Bank between 1948 and 
1967.82  Specifically, the Defense of Transjordan Law was cited 
as terminating the regulations.83  This position was also rejected 
by the Court, which found that the regulations had remained in 
continual effect since the time they were enacted by the Brit-
ish.84  Challenges to individual regulations promulgated under 
the Defense (Emergency) Regulations have also failed.85 
III. HOUSE DEMOLITIONS 
Since 1967, house demolitions have been utilized as a puni-
tive measure against residents of the West Bank and Gaza.86  
This Part will explore the reasons and justifications for the use 
of demolitions.  It will also describe the circumstances under 
which demolitions take place. 
The phrase “house demolition” refers to the physical destruc-
tion of a house or portion of a house by government actors.87  
The Israeli Defense Forces have conducted house demolitions 
since the time the West Bank and Gaza were occupied.88  The 
  
 81. Id.  The Court relied on Military Order No. 160, which stated that 
“hidden laws” are invalid, but also noted that general principles of law would 
lead to the same result.  Id.  See generally Military Order No. 160, summa-
rized in English and reprinted in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 23. 
 82. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 94. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Awad v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria, 33(3) P.D. 
309, 313 (1979), summarized in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 343 (1979). 
 85. Id. at 314 (holding that Regulation 112 was not implicitly repealed by 
Article 9 of the Constitution of Jordan);  Kawasame v. Minister of Defense, 
35(1) P.D. 617, 626 (1980), summarized in English in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
349 (1981) (finding that Military Order No. 224 required express repeal of 
regulations and, thus, Regulation 112 was still valid in Jordan); Maslam v. 
IDF Commander in Gaza 45(3) P.D. 444, 455 (1991) (holding that Egyptian 
enactment of the Basic Law for the Gaza Strip in 1955 and the Constitution of 
Gaza in 1962 did not contradict Regulation 112). 
 86. See COON, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Simon, supra note 46, at 7. 
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measure is rooted in a British military practice dating to the 
beginning of the twentieth century.89  
Demolitions are employed for several reasons.  First, houses 
may be demolished because a building permit was not sought 
prior to their construction.90  Second, houses are demolished for 
security reasons as a part of military operations.91  Finally, 
demolitions are used as a punitive measure against persons 
suspected of taking part in criminal activity.92  It is this punitive 
measure that will be specifically addressed in this article. 
The Israeli military has clearly embraced the use of housing 
demolitions in the West Bank and Gaza.93  Israel’s civilian gov-
ernments have also generally supported the policy, albeit to dif-
ferent degrees.94  However, it is significant that these govern-
ments have supported the continued use of housing demolitions, 
rather than the official adoption of them as policy.95  This politi-
cal sleight-of-hand exists because Israel denies that it is re-
sponsible for implementation of the demolition policy.96  Rather, 
it argues that this policy was thrust upon it and that it is, in 
fact, obliged to maintain the practice.97 
A. Legal Justification for Demolitions 
The legal basis for housing demolitions is Regulation 119 of 
the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (“DER 119”), 
promulgated during the British mandate.98  This regulation 
stated that: 
  
 89. See id. at 8.  House demolitions were first authorized by British com-
manders in South Africa during the Boer War.  Id. The practice was exported 
to mandatory Palestine and was used in response to Arab insurrection.  Id.  
Prior to expiration of the mandate, Jewish paramilitary units utilized house 
demolitions against Arabs in response to attacks.  Id. at 8.  Interestingly, the 
British never used the practice against Jews in mandatory Palestine.  Id. at 
8–9. 
 90. For a discussion of this issue, see generally COON, supra note 4, at 19. 
 91. Id. at 15–16. 
 92. Id. at 9. 
 93. See id. at 19. 
 94. See Simon, supra note 46, at 14. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 18. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 15•19 (discussing implementation 
of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 by the British Government). 
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A Military Commander may, by order, direct the forfeiture to 
the government of Palestine any house, structure of land from 
which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been ille-
gally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incen-
diary article illegally thrown, or any house, structure or land 
situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street the in-
habitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied 
have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the com-
mission of, or been accessories after the fact to the commission 
of, any offense against these regulations involving violence or 
intimidation or any military court offenses; and when any 
house, structure, or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the military 
commander may destroy the house or the structure or any-
thing in or on the house, the structure, or the land.99 
A military commander was thus given the power to forfeit 
and destroy a personal dwelling from which an attack was 
made.  Moreover, power was also conferred to destroy a house if 
the inhabitants of that housing area had been involved in vio-
lent offenses.  Theoretically, this allowed for the destruction of 
all homes located in a village where a violent act had occurred, 
regardless of the lack of connection between the house, the in-
habitants of the area, and the offense. 
The burden of proof required to engage this measure is quite 
low.  The military commander must simply have “reason to sus-
pect” that the house has been used to fire a weapon or throw 
explosives, or be “satisfied” that inhabitants of an area have 
committed a violent offense.100  Additionally, there is no stan-
dard regarding the severity of the offense that must be met.101  
Even relatively minor actions could fall under the scope of DER 
119.  Nor is ownership of the subject structure relevant.102  Fi-
nally, there is no judicial process or review; the decision lies 
solely within the discretion of the military commander.103 
Upon occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel adopted a 
policy to preserve existing pre-occupation law.104  Among the 
  
 99. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, supra note 18, Regulation 119 [here-
inafter DER 119]. 
 100. See Simon, supra note 46, at 18. 
 101. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 97. 
 102. Id. at 98–99. 
 103. Id. at 99. 
 104. See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining the maintenance of prior law in the 
occupied territories). 
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laws purportedly preserved were the Defense (Emergency) 
Regulations of 1945 and, more specifically, DER 119.105  Thus, 
pre-occupation law has provided the justification for the use of 
housing demolitions.  Demolition orders issued by military 
commanders clearly state that they are issued pursuant to Arti-
cle 119 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.106 
B. Practice of Demolition 
Demolitions have been utilized to varying degrees since the 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.  The measure 
has been used more frequently in times of high tension.107  In 
the years following the occupation, the first Intifada of the late 
1980s and the Al-Aqsa Intifada, beginning in September 2000, 
there has been a marked increase in the use of the demolition 
practice.108  This section will examine the mechanics and imple-
mentation of that practice.  
Soon after the occupation began, Israel began to seal homes 
as an alternative to the demolition of houses in certain cases.109  
In this practice, doors and windows are cemented or bolted 
shut, sealing off a room or an entire building.110  Although 
homes are not literally demolished, sealing is generally consid-
ered to be a form of demolition.111  Israeli Attorney General Meir 
Shamgar confirmed in 1971 that in the government’s view, 
“[d]emolitions are of two kinds: (a) actual demolition, or (b) evic-
tion of a person from the building and closing of the building or 
flat, without destroying it.”112  While not expressly provided for 
by DER 119, it is accepted that sealing is implicitly permitted 
as a less severe sanction.113   
  
 105. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10. 
 106. See id. at 42–43 (providing examples of demolition orders issued by 
Israeli military commanders). 
 107. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 97–98. 
 108. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145. 
 109. See Simon, supra note 46, at 7. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Adminis-
tered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 275 (1971).  Shamgar later became 
a justice of the Israeli Supreme Court.  
 113. See Simon, supra note 43, at 7. 
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Sealing is employed in a variety of situations.  According to 
Attorney General Shamgar, it is used “mainly when there are 
other inhabitants in the building who have no connection to the 
offense.”114  Sealing is also used when demolition cannot be car-
ried out because of the damage to neighboring structures, such 
as in the case of a single apartment in a larger complex.115  Fi-
nally, this method may be utilized in response to less severe 
offenses since unlike actual demolition, sealing is potentially 
reversible.116 
The Israeli Defense Forces carry out demolition and sealing 
orders that are issued by military commanders and reviewed by 
various officials, including the Minister of Defense.117  Demoli-
tion orders are executed using explosives or an armored bull-
dozer,118 while sealing is accomplished using brick or metal 
plates.119  These operations usually take place under the cover of 
darkness or during a declared curfew to minimize interfer-
ence.120  In the past, no prior notice was provided, although 
families were sometimes given between a half-hour and two 
hours to evacuate the home and remove possessions before 
demolition.121  Intervention by the Israeli Supreme Court altered 
this practice,122 although recent demolitions have again taken 
place without prior notice.123 
Following the demolition or sealing, families are prohibited 
from using the forfeited land in any manner.124  A “closed area” 
is often declared, meaning that no one may enter the property 
for any reason.125  Additionally, no government assistance is 
  
 114. Id. 
 115. See Martin Carroll, The Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the 
Occupied Territories: An Analysis of Its Legality in International Law, 11 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195, 1196 (1990). 
 116. Id. 
 117. COHEN, supra note 25, at 99. 
 118. See Simon, supra note 46, at 7. 
 119. Id. 
 120. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 5. 
 121. Id. at 6. 
 122. See infra Part III.D (discussing the Israeli Supreme Court’s treatment 
of the issue). 
 123. See John Kifner, Israeli Court Upholds Blowing Up Houses, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A6. 
 124. Simon, supra note 46, at 7. 
 125. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 7. 
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provided to displaced families, who must instead rely on rela-
tives, neighbors, or international organizations, such as the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”).126 
The regulations grant the authority to demolish homes in an 
area, town, village, quarter, or street that are inhabited by per-
sons suspected of committing violent crimes,127 thus allowing the 
demolition of the homes of uninvolved persons who happen to 
live in an area where unrest has occurred.  The Israeli Defense 
Forces conducted these so-called “neighborhood punishment” 
demolitions in the early years of the occupation.128  Israel has, 
however, limited its application of DER 119 in recent years and 
no longer demolishes the houses of uninvolved neighbors.129  In-
stead, demolition has been reserved for cases in which an attack 
occurred from a home, or in which an inhabitant of the house 
was suspected of involvement in a violent offense.130   
This latter category, however, is still particularly troubling, 
as the term “inhabitant” has been given a broad definition to 
include persons who rarely live in a particular house.131  The 
house subject to demolition need not be the primary residence of 
the violent offender; often, it is a family home where an offender 
previously lived.132  Prior to 1979, the Israeli Government stated 
that a nexus was required between the regular occupants of the 
house and the offense;133 demolitions were only carried out when 
the regular occupants were aware of or in some way assisted in 
the offense.134  Since that time, however, houses have been de-
molished in circumstances where the regular occupants were 
completely unaware of the offender’s actions.135   
Authorities rarely wait until the individual has been con-
victed of a crime to carry out the demolition.  Most demolitions 
take place after the inhabitant suspected of engaging in a vio-
lent offense has been arrested.136  Usually, the suspect is simply 
  
 126. Id. 
 127. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 96–97; KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 146. 
 128. COHEN, supra note 25, at 97. 
 129. See id. at 96; KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 162. 
 130. KRETZMER , supra note 6, at 146. 
 131. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 96. 
 132. Id. at 96–97. 
 133. Id.  
 134. See Simon, supra note 46, at 17. 
 135. Id. 
 136. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3. 
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in custody, sometimes facing charges but often times not.137  In 
these cases, demolition takes place in addition to other punish-
ment under the criminal system.138 
In other cases, demolitions proceed despite the fact that the 
suspect cannot be found and has therefore not been arrested.139  
Demolitions may even occur following the death of the sus-
pect.140  In these circumstances, even the death of the alleged 
perpetrator does not prevent demolition of his family’s home. 
Additionally, ownership of the house is irrelevant.  In some 
cases, rented houses have been demolished based on the actions 
of tenants without notice to the landlord.141  Even buildings 
owned by UN agencies have been demolished pursuant to DER 
119.142 
The government asserts that the owners of homes that are 
demolished in error have been compensated upon discovery of 
the error.143  A procedure also exists which allows property own-
ers to claim damages for injury to property.144  This claims proc-
ess is administered by the military government and is not sub-
ject to review by Israeli courts.145 
It is highly significant that no demolitions have been carried 
out against Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza or 
against homes within Israel itself, despite the fact that DER 
119 remains in force in Israel as well.146  The measure has solely 
been used against Palestinian homes, and only in the West 
Bank and Gaza.   
Furthermore, there has been a distinct lack of uniformity in 
the application of DER 119 by the military government.  The 
practices referred to in this section are not necessarily followed, 
and a great deal of discretion remains in the hands of the mili-
tary commander.147  Although generalities appear to exist, no 
clear standards have emerged regarding the severity of the of-
  
 137. Id.  
 138. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 147. 
 139. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 98–99. 
 142. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 5. 
 143. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 99. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Stone, supra note 25, at 83. 
 147. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 146. 
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fense, the connection of the suspect to the house, ownership of 
the property, or the type of demolition carried out.148   
C. Policy Considerations 
Israel justifies this policy of housing demolitions through 
DER 119, which it claims is a part of pre-occupation law.149  Re-
gardless of the validity of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 
of 1945, this regulation at most allows demolitions; it does not 
compel them.  Since the occupation began, the policy decision to 
carry out demolitions has been made by various Israeli govern-
ments, and has been subject to great debate. 
Proponents of the policy cite its importance as an immediate 
and forceful form of punishment.150  They argue that resort to 
the judicial process would detract from the immediate deterrent 
effect of the demolition.151  Indeed most demolitions take place a 
very short time after the offense, and it cannot be denied that 
blowing up a house leaves a mark on the minds of neighbors.  
The demolition results in a “pillar of smoke that everyone sees, 
hears, and understands.”152  
Specifically, military officials have cited the effectiveness of 
the demolition policy in deterring individuals from assisting 
saboteurs.153  They argue that the potential punishment for 
those who indirectly support and assist terrorists is essential to 
the maintenance of order in the Occupied Territories.154  Inter-
estingly, this argument seems to advocate the use of collective 
punishment as an effective deterrent. 
The demolition policy also serves the wider purpose of reaf-
firming Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza.155  House 
demolitions clearly display the power of the Israeli military and 
  
 148. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
 149. See Simon, supra note 46, at 15. 
 150. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 100. 
 151. Simon, supra note 46, at 10. 
 152. Id. (quoting former Brigadier General Shlomo Gazit, The Administered 
Territories — Policy and Actions, 204 MA’ARAHOT 25, 37 (1970) (Hebrew)).  As 
a Brigadier General, Gazit was involved in administration of the military 
government in the early years of the occupation.  Id. at 10 n.40.   
 153. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 97 (quoting former Brigadier General 
Shlomo Gazit and former Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan’s support of demo-
litions to maintain order). 
 154. Id.  
 155. See Simon, supra note 46, at 10–11. 
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demonstrate the response with which unrest will be met.  Do-
mestic political considerations also encourage this dramatic 
show of force.156 
Defenders of demolition argue that it is a lesser evil than 
other forms of punishment, which might be required if it were 
not used.  They assert that the use of demolitions is far prefer-
able to death penalty, which is not used by Israel.157  The demo-
lition of a house is also claimed to be a simply a monetary pun-
ishment, and is therefore better than the detention or punish-
ment of a person.158   
These arguments are flatly rejected by critics who point out 
that demolition invariably occurs in conjunction with other 
forms of punishment.  Offenders are still detained, convicted, 
and punished in the judicial system.159  Demolition, then, repre-
sents an additional, extrajudicial punishment that is often not 
even borne by the offender, but rather by his family or 
neighbors. 
Opponents of the policy also argue that demolitions damage 
the Palestinian identity.160  Since Palestinians have historic ties 
to the land, the forfeiture and demolition of homes is a particu-
larly severe and intrusive form of punishment.161  This fact, 
along with the collective nature of the punishment, serves to 
alienate the Palestinian population and increase, rather than 
reduce, the level of tension and violence.162 
Numerous Israeli leaders have, therefore, criticized the pol-
icy, including former military leaders.163  Housing demolitions 
are a source of great political debate, and have generally been 
less enthusiastically supported by Israel’s Labour govern-
ments.164  Additionally, many leaders are keenly aware of the 
damage the policy causes to Israel’s image in the world commu-
nity.165 
  
 156. See id. at 11–12.   
 157. COHEN, supra note 25, at 103. 
 158. Id. at 101 (quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz). 
 159. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3. 
 160. See Simon, supra note 46, at 11–12. 
 161. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 96. 
 162. See id. at 13. 
 163. See id. at 13–14 (profiling former military leaders who later stated 
their opposition to the demolition policy). 
 164. Id. at 8. 
 165. See id. at 13 (quoting former Israeli Foreign Minister Abbas Eban). 
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D. Israeli Supreme Court 
Prior to 1979, the Israeli Supreme Court was uninvolved in 
the demolition practice.166  Demolitions were conducted immedi-
ately overnight, and no opportunity existed for the aggrieved 
party to seek judicial recourse.167  Thus, the Court had no oppor-
tunity to pass judgment on the legality of the practice.  
In 1979, sitting as the High Court of Justice, the Israeli Su-
preme Court received its first demolition case.  The facts in 
Sakhwill v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Re-
gion168 were favorable to the military government, arguably the 
reason Israel’s Attorney General allowed the petition to reach 
the Court.  The petitioner’s son had been arrested for involve-
ment in terrorist activities and had already been convicted by 
the time the High Court heard the case.169  In addition, the sanc-
tion to be imposed was the sealing of one room in the house that 
had been directly used in commission of the offense.170 
In a brief opinion, the Court upheld the demolition order.171  
Thus, the state achieved judicial endorsement of the demolition 
practice.  In addition to confirming that DER 119 was valid law, 
the Court concluded that contradictory provisions in interna-
tional humanitarian law did not prevent the military govern-
ment from exercising its authority under existing local law.172  
This supremacy of local law over substantive international law 
would become a key aspect of the Court’s subsequent rulings.173 
The next cases heard by the Court represented a gradual 
broadening of the High Court’s acceptance of the demolition 
practice.  The Court’s second demolition decision also involved a 
sealing of the rooms of two individuals who had confessed to 
  
 166. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 146. 
 167. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 168. Sakhwill et al. v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 
34(1) P.D. 464 (1979), summarized in English in 10 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345 
(1980). 
 169. Id. at 346. 
 170. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148.   
 171. See id.  
 172. Sakhawill, 34(1) P.D. at 464, quoted in Simon, supra note 46, at 28. 
 173. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148.  See also Simon, supra note 46, at 
46.  
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serious offenses.174  Again, the premises were connected to the 
offense.175  A subsequent case also involved the sealing of a 
house, but without any connection between the offense and the 
premises.176  This progression continued as the Court upheld the 
actual demolition of the houses of families who had confessed to 
murder177 and the demolition of houses of persons who had con-
fessed to terrorist acts.178  The Court also rejected the argument 
that the house must be connected to the offense or that the 
other inhabitants must be aware of the terrorist activity.179 
Additionally, the Israeli Supreme Court accepted the mili-
tary’s broad definition of the term “inhabitant” for purposes of 
DER 119.180  It upheld the demolitions of parents’ homes when 
the offenders, their sons, had lived away at school most of the 
year.181  The Court later stated that residence “from time to 
time” was sufficient to establish residence for purposes of the 
regulation.182 
Families with reason to believe that their homes would be 
demolished began filing early petitions challenging demolition 
orders and were able to seek legal intervention prior to the exe-
cution order by military authorities.183  Often, families filed peti-
tions after a family member had been arrested for a serious of-
fense and they suspected that demolition would be forthcom-
ing.184  In 1987, military authorities stated their intention to 
grant administrative hearings prior to carrying out demolition 
  
 174. Khamed v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria 35(3) P.D. 223 
(1981), discussed in KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Khamamara v. Minister of Defense, 36(2) P.D. 755 (1982), discussed in 
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148. 
 177. See Khamri v. Commander in Judea and Samaria, 36(3) P.D. 439 
(1982), summarized in English in 17 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 314 (1987). 
 178. See Muzlakh v. Minster of Defense, 36(4) P.D. 610 (1982). 
 179. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 154.  
 180. See id. at 154–55. 
 181. See, e.g., Khamri, 36(3) P.D. at 442, summarized in English in 17 ISR. 
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 314 (1987). 
 182. Jabar v. Officer Commanding Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522, 525 
(1987), summarized in English in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 252, 252–253 (1988). 
 183. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 155 (discussing judicial intervention 
prior to 1989). 
 184. See, e.g., Sakhawill, 34(1) P.D. at 464, quoted in Simon, supra note 43, 
at 28; Khamed, 35(3) P.D. at 223, discussed in KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 
155. 
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orders “except in severe and exceptional cases.”185  This policy, 
however, was not followed in all cases.186  
Finally, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel intervened, 
filing a general petition requesting hearings in all demolition 
cases.187  The Association argued that Israeli administrative law 
required both a hearing and the opportunity to petition the 
High Court of Justice to appeal the hearing.188  The Court 
agreed with this proposition, and in Association for Civil Rights 
in Israel v. Commander-in-Chief of the Central Region189 ruled 
that both hearing and opportunity to petition were required.  
Furthermore, the Court rejected the military request to main-
tain an exception in severe cases, declaring instead that the 
military could temporarily seal houses in such cases, pending 
judicial review.190   
Since this 1989 ruling, the Court has routinely reviewed peti-
tions pursuant to this ruling.191  This judicial oversight has re-
duced the overall number of demolition orders issued by mili-
tary commanders.192  Nonetheless, the Court has interfered with 
very few of the demolition orders that it has reviewed.193  Gener-
ally the Court limited its review to the procedural legality of the 
decision to issue a demolition order, without addressing the 
merits of that decision.194  Other issues have been dismissed.  
For example, the Court has rejected arguments challenging the 
  
 185. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 155 (citing Zaid v. IDF Commander in 
Judea & Sumaria, 1987(2) Takdin-Elyon 53). 
 186. See id. at 156. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander-in-Chief of the 
Central Region, 43(2) P.D. 529, summarized in English in 23 ISR. Y.B. HUM. 
RTS. 294, 296 (1993). 
 190. Id . One exception was allowed, although it is not applicable to punitive 
demolitions.  The Court ruled that hearing could be bypassed in “operational 
military circumstances in which judicial review is incompatible with condi-
tions of place and time or the nature of the circumstances.”  Id. at 540–41.  See 
generally supra text accompanying note 90-92 (discussing the three reasons 
housing demolitions are utilized.) 
 191. See Simon, supra note 46, at 32. 
 192. See id. at 36. 
 193. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 157. 
 194. Id. at 158. 
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effectiveness of demolition as a deterrent.195  Thus, military 
commanders were left with considerable discretion despite the 
opportunity for judicial review.   
One of the rare cases in which the Court did review the deci-
sion to issue a demolition order occurred in Turkmahn v. Minis-
ter of Defense.196  In that case, the perpetrator was convicted of 
murder, and authorities issued an order to demolish the house 
where he lived with his mother, seven unmarried siblings, and 
a married sibling’s family.197  Although demolitions had been 
upheld in cases with similar factual backgrounds,198 for the first 
time, the Court adopted a proportionality test.199  It found that 
demolition of the entire house would be a disproportionate pun-
ishment, and ordered that only two of three rooms in the house 
could be sealed.200   
Experts have been puzzled over the Court’s sudden interven-
tionist approach and its distinction between nuclear family and 
a sibling’s separate family.201  The decision, however, generally 
restricted demolitions to the home of an offender’s nuclear fam-
ily.202  Moreover, authorities became more likely to seal individ-
ual rooms in multi-unit buildings than to destroy the entire 
building.203   
The relative restraint created by judicial review has suffered 
greatly as the Al-Aqsa Intifada has progressed.  Military au-
thorities have begun to bypass the requirement of hearing and 
  
 195. See generally Aga v. IDF Commander in Gaza, 44(1) P.D. 536 (1989), 
summarized in English in 23 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 330 (1993).  Arguments 
based on substantive international law have likewise been rejected, as will be 
discussed in the following parts of this Article. 
 196. Turkmahn v. Minister of Defense, 48(1) P.D. 217 (1991). 
 197. See id.   
 198. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 160. 
 199. See Simon, supra note 46, at 35. 
 200. See Turkmahn, 48(1) P.D. at 220–21. 
 201. See Simon, supra note 46, at 36–37; KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 160–
61. 
 202. See Simon, supra note 46, at 36. 
 203. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 161.  The Israeli military is viewed as 
being conscious of its image and concerned about maintaining its legitimacy.  
Because of this concern, it seeks to avoid criticism from the High Court of 
Justice and generally avoids actions that it believes the Court would not con-
done.  See Simon, supra note 46, at 37. 
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appeal, and instead resumed immediate demolitions.204  A judi-
cial challenge to this practice by 43 families proved unsuccess-
ful. 205    In a 2002 decision the Israeli Supreme Court held that 
because Israel is “in the midst of combat activity” the notice and 
appeal requirement introduced in Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel may be suspended.206  Suspension is warranted when 
“there is a serious fear that awarding the right of hearing will 
endanger the lives of soldiers and endanger the action itself.”207    
Days later, the Court issued a decision stating that in such cir-
cumstances, petitioners should make their case directly to the 
military commander rather than the Court.208  It is uncertain 
whether the Court will resume judicial review of demolition 
cases in the future.    
E. Statistics 
It is difficult to compile accurate statistics regarding punitive 
house demolitions by the Israeli Defense Forces for a number of 
reasons.  First, government figures and those compiled by non-
governmental organizations have historically differed, indicat-
ing that these groups are inconsistent in how or what they 
count.209  Second, access to areas of the West Bank and Gaza is 
frequently restricted, making verification of demolitions diffi-
cult for relief workers, human rights advocates, and non-
governmental personnel.210 Third, substantial portions of vil-
  
 204. See PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET: CRIMES 
AGAINST HOUSING AND AGRICULTURE (2002); B’Tselem, House Demolitions — 
Statistics, at http://www. btselem.org/English/House_Demolitions/Statistics. 
asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2003). 
 205. Nahil Adal Saadu Amar et al. v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, 
HCJ 6696/02 (Aug. 5, 2002).  See also Kifner, supra note 123, at A6; Dan Izen-
berg, Court Approved Destruction of Terrorist’s Families Homes, JERUSALEM 
POST, Aug. 7, 2002, at 1. 
 206.   Amar, 6696/02, ¶ 2.  See also Kifner, supra note 123, at A6.  
 207. Amar, 6696/02, ¶ 5. 
 208. Mahmud Aida Aadi Salah A Din v. IDF Commander of the West Bank, 
6868/02 (Aug. 8, 2002). 
 209. See SHANE DARCY, AL HAQ, ISRAEL’S PUNITIVE HOUSE DEMOLITION 
POLICY: COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 
(2003), available at http://www.alhaq.org/publications/index.htm (last visited 
May 31, 2003).  
 210. Jeff Halper, The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control, at 
http://www.icahd.org (last visited May 12, 2003. 
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lages or neighborhoods were demolished in the early years of 
the occupation, creating a situation where counting individual 
homes was not feasible.211  Finally, the distinction between 
houses demolished for punitive reasons and those demolished in 
security operations or for building permit violations is some-
times difficult to survey and is often ignored by mass media 
sources or even non-governmental organizations.  Thus, figures 
reported by these entities may include houses demolished for 
differing reasons. 
Accurate accounting for the early years of the occupation is 
the most difficult.  For example, the Israeli Government re-
ported that 1,265 houses were demolished between 1967 and 
1981.212  Meanwhile, the ICRC found that 1,224 houses were 
demolished between 1967 and 1978.213 
In more recent years, figures show that a significant number 
of demolitions were carried out between 1988 and 1991 at the 
height of the first Intifada.214  Demolitions were used sparingly 
after the Oslo accords and at the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Inti-
fada.215  Recent suicide bombings, however, have resulted in a 
substantial increase in punitive demolitions with twenty houses 
demolished between August 2 and August 9, 2002.216  Figure 1 is 
one non-governmental organization’s documentation of demoli-
tions and sealings pursuant to DER 119 since the beginning of 










 211. See DARCY, supra note 209, at 8. 
 212. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145. 
 213. DARCY, supra note 209, at 8. 
 214. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145. 
 215. See infra Figure 1. 
 216. Jonathan Steele, Israeli ‘Restraint’ Still Means Terror for the Palestini-
ans, GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2002, at 16.  See also John Kifner, Militants Reject 
Policy on Attacks in Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002. 
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1987* 1 0 N/A N/A 
1988 125 24 39 26 
1989 144 18 76 27 
1990 107 11 97 11 
1991 46 4 34 20 
1992 8 2 25 16 
1993 1 2 18 15 
1994 0 1 4 3 
1995 0 0 1 0 
1996 11 0 0 0 
1997 6 0 2 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 
2001 8 1 0 0 
2002 187 1 0 0 
2003† 89 0 3 0 
Totals 733 64 299 118 
*  Beginning December 9, 1987. 
†  Through April 29, 2003. 
 
 
Additionally, another non-governmental organization found 
that only 8.4% of homes demolished between 1981 and 1991 
were owned by the offender.218  The remaining homes were 
owned by family members, third parties, or were rented.219  Fig-
ure 2 shows the ownership of homes in cases before the Israeli 




 217. B’Tselem, supra note 204. 
 218. LYNN WELCHMAN, A THOUSAND AND ONE HOMES: ISRAEL’S DEMOLITION 
AND SEALING OF HOUSES IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 6 (1993). 
 219. Id. 
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Figure 2:  Ownership of 145 homes in adjudicated cases220 
 
 Offender Parents Siblings Relative Rental Unknown 
Number 7 69 16 9 6 38 
Percent 4.8 47.6 11.0 6.2 4.1 26.2 
 
 
Finally, Israeli citizens make up approximately 10% of the 
population in the Occupied Territories.221  Yet, only Palestinian 
homes have been demolished pursuant to DER 119.222  The 
measure has not been used against Jews living in the West 
Bank and Gaza, nor has it been used inside of Israel, where 
DER 119 also remains in force.223 
IV. HOUSE DEMOLITIONS AS A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
This Part analyzes the legality of punitive demolitions under 
international human rights law.  Human rights law is con-
cerned with the relationship of the state to its own people.224  
Thus, it is often overlooked in favor of humanitarian law, which 
is the law of armed conflict, when discussing the West Bank 
and Gaza.225  However, the implications of humanitarian law are 
still relevant and important to the dialogue.  In fact, many 
scholars consider humanitarian law to be a branch of human 
rights law.226 
Human rights law is sometimes assumed to be inapplicable in 
situations of armed conflict.  This assumption is based on the 
fact that territorial or jurisdictional issues may limit the appli-
cation of human rights law, and that derogations from interna-
  
 220. See Simon, supra note 46, at 17. 
 221. Online Newshour, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the website of the 
Newshour with Jim Lehrer), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/ 
conflict/map.html (last visited May 21, 2003). 
 222. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10–11. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UNT.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICCPR]. 
 225. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39. 
 226. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 1–3.  But see JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN 
LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 13 (1975) (stating that human 
rights is a branch of humanitarian law). 
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tional instruments may minimize their protection during peri-
ods of conflict.227  Still, the prevailing view is that human rights 
law, when applicable, is available to supplement humanitarian 
law.228  This argument is particularly persuasive during pro-
longed periods of occupation.229  This Part will examine the ap-
plication of human rights law, analyze DER 119 under it, and 
discuss the enforcement of human rights provisions. 
A. Application 
The most significant instrument in international human 
rights law is the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”).230  This instrument was signed by Israel on 
December 19, 1966, and was ratified on October 3, 1991.231  The 
instrument took effect with regard to Israel on the date it was 
ratified. 
Some scholars dispute the application of the ICCPR to the 
conflict regions, arguing that this treaty only governs the rela-
tionship of a state to its own nationals and not those in occupied 
territories.232  While true in some situations, this argument does 
not hold true in the West Bank and Gaza.  Article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR states that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals in its ter-
ritory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant.”233  The nature of the prolonged occupation 
and Israel’s insistence that no other nation exercised sovereign 
power in the territories prior to the occupation lead to the con-
clusion that the territories should be considered Israeli territory 
for purposes of Article 2(1).  In any event, Palestinians living in 
the West Bank and Gaza are clearly subject to the jurisdiction 
  
 227. COHEN, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 228. Id. at 3–4. 
 229. Id. 
 230. ICCPR, supra note 224. 
 231. Id. (Ratification Index). 
 232. See, e.g., H. Meyrowitz, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Droits de l’Homme, 
88 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A 
L’ETRANGER 1059, 1104 (1972) (suggesting that human rights law does not 
protect enemy nationals). 
 233. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 2(1). 
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of the Israeli military government234 and are thus entitled to 
protection of the rights enumerated in the ICCPR. 
The ICCPR provides that a State Party may derogate from its 
obligations under the treaty in a “time of public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation.”235  Derogation is only 
permissible “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation.”236  Furthermore, no derogation is permitted with 
regard to certain enumerated articles,237 and notice of deroga-
tion must be given to all other States Parties.238 
Israel submitted notice of derogation to the Secretary-
General of the Untied Nations on October 3, 1991, the same day 
that it ratified the ICCPR.239  The notice stated that a state of 
emergency had existed in Israel since its independence in 1948 
due to “threats of war, of actual armed attacks, and campaigns 
of terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to human 
beings.”240  In order to defend itself and protect life and property, 
Israel stated that powers of arrest and detention inconsistent 
with ICCPR Article 9 were required.241  The notice asserted that 
Israel would derogate to the extent that measures it utilized 
were inconsistent with Article 9.242  No further derogation was 
made. 
With the exception of Article 9, the ICCPR applies to Israel.  
Thus, these same provisions apply in areas subject to its juris-
diction, including the West Bank and Gaza.  The next section 
will examine whether punitive demolitions violate these provi-
sions. 
  
 234. See supra Part II (describing the legal regime in the West Bank and 
Gaza). 
 235. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 4(1). 
 236. Id. 
 237. No derogation is permitted from articles 6, 7, 8(1), 8(2), 11, 15, 16 and 
18.  Id. art. 4(2). 
 238. Id. art. 4(3). 
 239. Notice of Derogation submitted by Israel to the Secretary-General, Oct. 
3, 1991. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id.  Article 9 generally deals with powers of arrest and detention.  
ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 9. 
File: FARRELL Base MacroFinal.doc Created on: 6/14/2003 3:03 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:23 PM 
2003] PALESTINIAN HOUSE DEMOLITION 903 
B. Analysis 
The ICCPR is considered to be a strong statement of individ-
ual rights.243  Not surprisingly, though, it contains no express 
prohibition against housing demolitions.244  However, it can be 
reasonably construed from the language of several articles of 
the ICCPR that the demolition practice is contrary to its terms.   
The most obvious starting point is Article 17.  It states that 
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his . . . home . . . .”245  This article also guarantees pro-
tection of the law from such interference.246  Still, Article 17 fails 
to offer significant protection.  So long as demolitions are pur-
suant to DER 119, they are not unlawful.  The argument that 
demolitions are carried out arbitrarily would also likely fail as 
they are based on the reasonable suspicion of the military com-
mander.247 
A stronger argument against demolitions can be made under 
Article 7 of the ICCPR.  This article states that “[n]o one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”248  Article 7 is considered one of the 
core rights protected under the human rights scheme and can-
not be derogated from in any circumstances.249  It is entirely 
reasonable that the demolition of a person’s home can be con-
sidered a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or 
treatment.250  This practice leaves families without shelter, and 
frequently personal possessions are destroyed in the process as 
well.251  Additionally, in over 90% of cases, demolitions are im-
posed on a homeowner who is not the offender.252 
  
 243. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT (Henry Steiner & Philip 
Alson eds., 2d ed. 2000); Brian Farrell, South Africa and Affirmative Action: 
The Legality of the Employment Equity Act Under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 5 TRINITY COL. L. REV. 202, 212 (2002). 
 244. See generally ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 9. 
 245. Id. art. 17(1). 
 246. Id. art. 17(2). 
 247. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145–46. 
 248. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 7. 
 249. See id. art. 4(2) (prohibiting derogation from Article 7). 
 250. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 147. 
 251. See, e.g., Selçuk & Asker v. Turkey, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 477, ¶ 74. 
 252. See WELCHMAN, supra note 218, at 6.  
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A precedent exists for this conclusion.  Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention, like Article 7 of the ICCPR, prohibits inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment.253  As with its 
ICCPR counterpart, Article 3 is also nonderogable.254  The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) has held that 
the punitive demolition of an individual’s house in certain cir-
cumstances constitutes inhuman punishment.255  This determi-
nation depends on the circumstances of the case.256 
The European Court has made clear that the prohibition 
against inhuman treatment is one of the most fundamental of 
rights.257  States are absolutely compelled to respect this norm 
“[e]ven in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight 
against organised terrorism and crime.”258  Presumably, this 
requirement would apply to situations of armed conflict as well. 
C. Enforcement 
Israel follows the English common law rule regarding the re-
lationship between domestic courts and international law.259  
While customary international law is enforceable in domestic 
courts, conventional international law is not unless incorpo-
rated into domestic law.260  The ICCPR has not been incorpo-
rated into Israeli domestic law and cannot, therefore, be en-
forced in Israel’s courts.  Likewise, no international tribunal 
has the competence to directly enforce the provisions of the 
covenant in Israel.261  Article 2(3)(a) requires each State Party to 
ensure that a person whose rights are violated “shall have an 
effective remedy,”262 this lack of a forum may in itself be a viola-
tion of the ICCPR. 
  
 253. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 3, 213 UNT.S. 221, 224.  
 254. Id. art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232. 
 255. See, e.g., Selçuk & Asker v. Turkey, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 477, ¶ 74. 
 256. Id. ¶ 76.  The Court has taken into account such factors as the age of 
the occupants, the economic situation of the family, the motivation of govern-
ment forces, and assistance available following demolition.  Id. ¶ 77. 
 257. Id. ¶ 75. 
 258. Id.  
 259. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31. 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
 261. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 243, at 987. 
 262. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 2(3)(a). 
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An important point should be made regarding enforcement.  
The enforceability of a provision of international law is distinct 
from the applicability of the provision.263  The inability to en-
force Article 7 of the ICCPR does not alter the conclusion that it 
is applicable.  A violation of Article 7 remains a violation of Ar-
ticle 7, despite the lack of enforcement.  While true that on a 
personal level an individual has no available remedy,264 on a 
higher level, the political and moral effect of recognition of the 
violation should not be dismissed.   
V. HOUSE DEMOLITIONS AS A VIOLATION OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 
The strongest arguments against housing demolitions are 
made under international humanitarian law.  Generally, hu-
manitarian law applies in situations of armed conflict.  One 
subset of humanitarian law is the law of belligerent occupation.  
The humanitarian law relevant to the discussion of housing 
demolitions can be found in two instruments, the Hague Regu-
lations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.265  Israel applies the 
Hague Regulations in domestic law but does not consider demo-
litions pursuant to DER 119 to violate this body of law.266  The 
Fourth Geneva Convention provides the stronger legal basis 
against demolitions, but Israel denies its application.267  This 
Part will first examine the application of the Hague Regulations 
and then consider applicability of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. 
A. Hague Regulations 
The conventions signed at The Hague in 1907 represent one 
of the most significant events in the development of humanitar-
ian law.268  Of interest to this discussion are the regulations an-
nexed to the fourth convention,269 commonly known as the 
  
 263. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34–35. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Simon, supra note 43, at 46–47. 
 266. Id. at 47. 
 267. Id. at 48. 
 268. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2001). 
 269. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, U.S.T.S. 539, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 (entered into force 
Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)]  
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Hague Regulations.270  The Regulations contain rules pertaining 
to the authority of an army over the territory of a hostile state, 
the foundation of the law of belligerent occupation.271   
1. Application of Regulations by the Israeli Supreme Court 
Following the occupation, the Israeli Supreme Court initially 
avoided ruling on the applicability of the Hague Regulations to 
the West Bank and Gaza.272  When the Court finally did address 
the issue, the Court ruled that the Hague Regulations and Ge-
neva Conventions were both conventional law and as such were 
unenforceable in Israeli courts.273  This ruling ignored the near-
universal view that the Hague Regulations were considered 
customary law, a fact that was immediately pointed out by Is-
rael’s academic community.274 
Eventually, the Court corrected its error.  In Ayyub v. Minis-
ter of Defense,275 the Court recognized the status of the Hague 
Regulations as customary international law.  As customary, 
rather than conventional, international law, the Regulations 
would be applicable and enforceable in Israel’s domestic courts.  
This pronouncement forced the Court to address a second is-
sue: the status of the West Bank and Gaza.  According to Sec-
tion III of the Hague Regulations, the regulation protections 
apply to territory occupied by a hostile army.276  The Court an-
swered this question directly, holding that Israeli military’s re-
  
 270. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, at Annex. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See, e.g., Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense, 
26(1) P.D. 574 (1971), summarized in English in 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354–56 
(1972); Electricity Corporation for Jerusalem District, Ltd. V. Minister of De-
fense 27(1) P.D. 124 (1972), summarized in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
381–83 (1975). 
 273. Hilu v. State of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169, 180 (1972), summarized in Eng-
lish in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975) (commonly referred to as the Rafiah 
Approach Case).  See generally supra text accompanying notes 71–72 (explain-
ing the distinction between customary and conventional international law in 
the Israeli system). 
 274. See generally Yoram Dinstein, The Judgment in the Rafiah Approach 
Case, 3 TEL AVIV U.L. REV. 934 (1974) (Hebrew).  Dinstein’s article is credited 
with almost single-handedly changing the Court’s view on this issue.  See 
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 36. 
 275. Ayyub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113 (1978), summarized in 
English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337, 341 (1979). 
 276. See Hague Regulations, supra note 39, § III. 
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lationship to the territories was that of an “occupying power.”277  
Thus, the Court concluded that the protections of the Hague 
Regulations applied in the territories and were domestically 
enforceable.278 
The Court’s application of the Hague Regulations with regard 
to housing demolitions, however, has essentially been limited to 
invocation of Article 43.279  This article states that: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed 
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the 
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possi-
ble, public order and safety, while respecting, unless abso-
lutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.280 
This provision, along with a similar clause in the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, formed the basis of the Court’s “local law doc-
trine.”281 
Following the occupation, the military government issued a 
proclamation concerning the continued validity of pre-existing 
law in the territories.282  One effect of this proclamation was the 
validation of DER 119, the basis for housing demolitions.283  
When confronted with challenges to DER 119 based on substan-
tive provisions of the Hague Regulations, the Court has simply 
declared the primacy of local law over such provisions, pre-
sumably pursuant to Article 43.284   
As a result, the Israeli Supreme Court has not analyzed hous-
ing demolitions under the substantive provisions of the Hague 
Regulations.  Rather, it has used Article 43 to justify the con-
tinued validity of DER 119.285  The Court has made no attempt 
to explain the apparent inconsistency between application of 
  
 277. Ayyub, 33(2) P.D. at 117, summarized in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. 
RTS. 337, 339. 
 278. See id. at 341. 
 279. See Simon, supra note 46, at 46–47. 
 280. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 43. 
 281. Simon, supra note 46, at 46–47. 
 282. See supra Part II.A.3. (discussing the preservation of pre-occupation 
law). 
 283. See supra Part III.A. (explaining the legal justification for demolitions). 
 284. Simon, supra note 46, at 47. 
 285. See Jabar v. Officer Commanding Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522, 
525 (1987), summarized in English in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 252–53 (1988). 
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one article and the disregard for other substantive articles.286  It 
appears, then, that arguments made under other articles of the 
Hague Regulations will continue to be dismissed without being 
fully addressed. 
2. Analysis of the Regulations 
Generally, the Hague Regulations are not as protective as the 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  However, strong 
arguments can be made under the regulations, and their accep-
tance as customary international law is significant.287  It is also 
of great importance that the Israeli Supreme Court has recog-
nized the application and enforceability of the Hague Regula-
tions, regardless of the use of the local law doctrine to limit ap-
plication of the Regulations with regard to housing demoli-
tions.288 
In utilizing the local law doctrine, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has not addressed Article 43 directly.289  Several academic writ-
ers, however, have suggested that the Article 43 requirement 
that existing law be respected preempts other substantive pro-
visions of the regulations.290  This argument runs contrary to the 
intent and purpose of the Hague Convention as a whole.  The 
requirement that the occupier respect existing law is intended 
to protect the population of the occupied territory, not bestow 
the occupier with draconian powers it would otherwise lack.291  
It is significant that with respect to laws, the drafters of the 
regulations chose the term “respect” rather than to “maintain” 
or to “enforce” laws previously in force.  Even if one were to con-
cede that there is an absolute obligation to respect DER 119 as 
pre-existing law regardless of contrary provisions, Article 43 
certainly does not compel the use of the law, which runs con-
trary to other substantive provisions of the regulations.   
  
 286. However, several academics, particularly Professor Julius Stone, have 
attempted to explain the inconsistency.  See, e.g., Stone, supra note 25, at 97. 
 287. See supra text accompanying notes 273–74; see also infra text accom-
panying notes 396–398 (noting the near-universal view that the Hague Regu-
lations represent customary international law). 
 288. See Simon, supra note 46, at 46–47. 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 280, 282, & 285. 
 290. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 25, at 96–97. 
 291. See Simon, supra note 46, at 52–53. 
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Additionally, Article 50 of the Hague Regulations prohibits 
collective punishment.  It states that “[n]o general penalty, pe-
cuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on 
account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be re-
garded as jointly and severally responsible.”292  This article has 
been broadly characterized as a “principle of individual respon-
sibility.”293 
The protection of Article 50 applies to individuals who are not 
jointly and severally responsible for an offense.  Clearly in 
many circumstances, individuals who have no knowledge of or 
connection to the illegal activity are punished along with the 
offender despite their innocence.294  It cannot be denied that in 
some cases, parents, family members, or friends may be aware 
of the offender’s illegal activity and actively assist, tacitly sup-
port, or willingly ignore the conduct.295  However, even if these 
individuals might be jointly and severally responsible, the pro-
tections of Article 50 are not denied to others who are inno-
cent.296  Moreover, military officials do not attempt to make a 
determination on the complicity of other residents of a house 
that is to be demolished.297   
The use of the term “population” in Article 50 may lead to the 
conclusion that collective punishment is prohibited only in 
situations where a wide group of people is punished, such as 
when all residents of a village are made to suffer for the actions 
of one resident.  However, such a reading is inconsistent with 
the purposes of the Hague Convention, which seek to preserve 
the “interests of humanity.”298  Demolitions sometimes leave 
  
 292. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 50. 
 293. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS 
CUSTOMARY LAW 47 (1991).  
 294. See supra Figure 2 (showing statistics regarding ownership of demol-
ished houses). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Simon, supra note 46, at 55–56. 
 297. See id. at 56. 
 298. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 269, at pmbl.  Under international 
law, when a treaty’s terms are inconclusive, they should be interpreted in 
light of the treaty’s context and purpose.  See Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 UNT.S. 331, 340 (entered into force 
Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
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dozens of people homeless;299 surely a family relationship should 
not dilute these interests. 
In response to the argument that housing demolitions might 
not be considered collective punishments, one must then turn to 
the Martens Clause, at the beginning of the Convention.  The 
clause provides that: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, 
the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare 
that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by 
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the 
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, 
as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public conscience.300 
Thus, it cannot simply be argued that no prohibition against 
housing demolitions exists in the enumerated articles of the 
Regulations.  Instead, this clause requires further recourse to 
state practice, the laws of humanity, and public conscience.  
Conceivably, these sources can be found in conventional inter-
national law, including the Geneva Conventions.301 
The prohibition against collective punishment should be un-
derstood to include non-individual punishment that extends to 
the offender’s family.302  The case for protection of family is bol-
stered by Article 46 of the Regulations, which states that 
“[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private 
property . . . must be respected.”303  Such values must be consid-
ered when attempting to discern the correct definition of the 
term “population.”304  This article goes on to declare that 
“[p]rivate property cannot be confiscated,”305 another indication 
of the protection afforded by the regulations.   
The sanctity of private property is most strongly stated in an 
unlikely place.  Article 56 declares that the “property of munici-
palities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and 
education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, 
  
 299. See Simon, supra note 46, at 53. 
 300. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 269. 
 301. See Simon, supra note 46, at 53. 
 302. Id. at 55. 
 303. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 46. 
 304. See Vienna Convention, supra note 298, art. 31(2)(b). 
 305. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 46.  
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shall be treated as private property.”306  This treatment as pri-
vate property means that “[a]ll seizure of, destruction or willful 
damage done to institutions of this character . . . is forbidden. .  
. .”307  This language demonstrates that private property de-
serves the utmost protection.  Places of worship, educational 
institutions, and museums are protected in the Regulations by 
elevating them to the same category as private property. 
It is universally agreed that the Hague Regulations apply to 
the West Bank and Gaza, and this fact has been confirmed by 
the Israeli Supreme Court.308  The Court has also declared that 
the Regulations are enforceable in domestic courts.309  This rec-
ognition by the Court is of incredible significance as it elimi-
nates any questions regarding application.   
The Court has, of course, used the local law doctrine to limit 
application with regard to housing demolitions.310  This limita-
tion, however, is not soundly based in the law of the Hague 
Regulations and only affects enforcement in Israeli courts.  
Again, while affecting individual petitions arising from the ter-
ritories, this limitation does not affect the terms of the Regula-
tions.  Although the Israeli Supreme Court has a monopoly on 
enforcement of the Hague Regulations in the West Bank and 
Gaza, the Court does not have a monopoly on the definitive in-
terpretation of the Regulations.311 
B. Fourth Geneva Convention 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 offer the most extensive 
statement of the laws of armed conflict.  The Conventions at-
tempted to redress weaknesses in the humanitarian law regime 
that became apparent during World War II.312  As a result, the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War313 (“Fourth Geneva Conven-
  
 306. Id. at art. 56 (emphasis added). 
 307. Id. (emphasis added). 
 308. See Simon, supra note 46, at 19. 
 309. Id. at 20. 
 310. Id. at 47–48. 
 311. Id. at 52–53. 
 312. See JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY — IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 3–4 (Major Ronald Grif-
fin & Mr. C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958). 
 313. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39. 
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tion”) are more detailed and comprehensive than the civilian 
protections contained in the Hague Regulations.314 
Unlike the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion is not a universally accepted statement of customary inter-
national law.315  However, individual provisions of the Conven-
tion are considered by many to be expressive of international 
custom.316  In any event, the Convention is widely accepted and 
has been ratified by more states than even the UN Charter.317 
This section will examine the practice of housing demolitions 
against the framework of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  The 
application of this Convention to the West Bank and Gaza will 
be explained from the perspectives of the Israeli Government 
and the Israeli Supreme Court before being independently ana-
lyzed.  The provisions of individual articles of the Convention 
impacting housing demolition will be reviewed, taking into ac-
count the positions of the government, academics, non-
governmental organizations and international institutions.  
Conclusions will then be drawn as to the applicability of these 
individual articles.   
1. Application 
Israel, Jordan, and Egypt are all parties to the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention.318  Each of these nations ratified the conven-
tion before 1967.319  There is no doubt that they are “High Con-
tracting Parties,” the term used to describe parties to the Con-
vention.320  The Convention is therefore binding on each of them. 
Complex issues arise regarding application of the Convention 
to the West Bank and Gaza.  Although the Convention is bind-
ing on each of the states involved, the provisions are only appli-
cable in certain circumstances.  Pursuant to Article 2, the pro-
tections of the Convention “shall apply to all cases of declared 
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two 
or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war 
  
 314. See PICTET, supra note 312, at 225. 
 315. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 36. 
 316. See MERON, supra note 293, at 5 n.5. 
 317. Id. at 4. 
 318. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, at 396, 387.  See also 
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
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is not recognized by one of them.”321  In addition, the Convention 
applies “to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory 
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets 
with no armed resistance.”322  
a. Position of Israeli Government 
Upon entry of Israeli forces into the West Bank, the military 
commander for the region issued a proclamation regarding the 
assumption of power by the Israeli military.323  Appended to the 
proclamation was an order regarding the establishment of the 
legal system for the region.  This order included a statement 
that required military tribunals to:  
[A]dhere to the terms of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 
1949 concerning the protection of civilians during war and re-
garding all matters relating to judicial procedure.  If there is a 
contradiction between this order and the above-mentioned 
Convention then the regulations of the Convention will take 
precedent.324 
Thus, the provisions of the Convention were incorporated into 
the military law of the region.325 
The military government soon repealed this order, presuma-
bly in response to political pressure to view the territories as 
“liberated” rather than “occupied.”326  An influential academic 
work provided a legal basis for this change.327  Authored by Pro-
fessor Yehuda Blum, the article discussed the application of 
international law governing belligerent occupation.  Blum un-
derstood the law of belligerent occupation to be based on the 
assumption that the ousted party had sovereignty over the ter-
ritory in question.328  Specifically, he questioned whether the 
  
 321. Id. art. 2. 
 322. Id.    
 323. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 324. Military Proclamation 3, art. 35 (1967), summarized in English and 
reprinted in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 1. 
 325. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 32. 
 326. Id. 
 327. See generally Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on 
the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279 (1968). 
 328. Id. at 293–94. 
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West Bank had been the sovereign territory of Jordan prior to 
1967.329 
Blum argued that the 1950 annexation of the West Bank by 
Jordan was not legitimate under international law, and thus, 
the West Bank had not been the sovereign territory of another 
state in 1967.330  As a result, the West Bank had not been the 
“territory of a High Contracting Party,” despite its effective con-
trol by Jordan, and did not meet the Article 2 requirements for 
application of the Convention.331  As one of the purposes of the 
Convention is to protect the reversionary rights of the previous 
sovereign, the article concluded that provisions aimed at pre-
serving these rights were inapplicable.332  Blum did, however, 
suggest that Israel was still bound by the humanitarian protec-
tions of the Convention.333 
This argument is the foundation of the Israeli Government’s 
position regarding application of the Convention to the West 
Bank and Gaza.  Following the article’s publication, the gov-
ernment adopted the stance that as a whole the Fourth Geneva 
Convention did not apply to the West Bank and Gaza.334  This 
view was based on the legitimate premise that although occu-
pied by Jordan and Egypt respectively, these regions had not 
been the sovereign territory of their respective states.335  At the 
same time, Israel stated its intention to comply with the Con-
  
 329. Id. at 280–81. 
 330. Id. at 281–95. 
 331. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 32. 
 332. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 43. 
 333. See generally Blum, supra note 327. 
 334. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 33.  A review of statements made by 
Israeli representatives before the United Nations suggests that Israel might 
have considered the issue unresolved until 1977, after which it clearly rejected 
application.  See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-
Occupied Territories 1967–1988, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 45 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).  
Cohen states that Israel’s Labour governments have generally considered the 
question of applicability unanswered, while Likud governments have viewed 
the Convention as inapplicable.  See COHEN, supra note 25, at 44. 
 335. For a discussion of the status of the West Bank and Gaza between 1948 
and 1967, see generally COHEN, supra note 25, at 44–51 (suggesting that these 
regions were not sovereign territory prior to 1967).  Incidentally, no issues 
regarding sovereignty arise in application of the Hague Regulations. 
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vention’s humanitarian provisions.336  Generally speaking, Israel 
has done so.337 
One exception to this compliance policy has been the provi-
sions potentially prohibiting the continued use of DER 119 as a 
punitive measure.338  Israel has maintained that Article 64 of 
the Convention concerning pre-existing law requires the state 
to apply DER 119 despite the fact that demolitions may run 
contrary to other substantive provisions of the Convention.339  
Although officials sometimes offer arguments as to why demoli-
tions do not violate individual provisions of the Convention, the 
official position is that these other provisions are superceded by 
DER 119 pursuant to Article 64.340   
b. Treatment by Israeli Supreme Court 
It is often noted that the Israeli Supreme Court has not ruled 
that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the West 
Bank and Gaza.341  It is less often mentioned that the Court has 
never ruled that the Convention is not applicable.  The Court 
has, essentially, avoided the issue.  Despite the fact that the 
Convention has been raised in numerous petitions, the Court 
has never directly ruled on its applicability.342  For the most 
part, the vast body of academic literature on the topic has been 
ignored in the opinions of the Court.343   
Since Israel has agreed to voluntarily abide by the Conven-
tion, the Court is somewhat limited in its ability to review indi-
vidual articles.344  The approval of the Attorney General must be 
secured before the Court examines an issue arising from a vol-
untary application.345  Generally, this approval has been limited 
  
 336. See Roberts, supra note 334, at 44–45. 
 337. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 44. 
 338. Simon, supra note 46, at 46. 
 339. Id. at 47. 
 340. Id. at 48. 
 341. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 54. 
 342. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 54.  It should be remembered, though, 
that the Court has held that Israel’s status in the West Bank and Gaza is that 
of a belligerent occupant.  See Ayyub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113, 
117 (1978), summarized in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979). 
 343. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 206 n.9. 
 344. See id. at 41. 
 345. See Qupty, supra note 25, at 103–04. 
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to circumstances in which the state will prevail without a 
doubt.346  
Individual justices, however, have expressed their own opin-
ions on the subject.  Prior to serving on the Court, Meir 
Shamgar championed the government’s interpretation of Article 
2 as Attorney General of Israel.347  On the other hand, various 
justices have indicated their openness to the application of the 
Convention, most notably Justice Alfred Witkon.  In dicta, he 
wrote, “It is a mistake to think that the Geneva Convention 
does not apply to Judea and Samaria.  It applies even though it 
is not justiciable in this court.”348 
Although the Court has not made an authoritative decision 
on the applicability of the Convention to the territories, it has 
explicitly ruled that the Convention is not enforceable in Is-
rael’s domestic courts.349  In Ayyub v. Minister of Defense,350 the 
Court distinguished between customary international law and 
conventional international law, confirming that the latter is not 
enforceable without enabling legislation.351  The Court has of-
fered this ruling as a partial justification for its reluctance to 
rule on applicability.352  Unlike the Hague Regulations, the 
Court holds the view that the Fourth Geneva Convention, even 
if applicable, does not create a cause of action for an individual 
in domestic courts.353   
While the Court has not considered whether the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention as a whole might constitute customary inter-
national law, it has examined this question regarding a particu-
  
 346. See id. at 108. 
 347. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 54.  In an article published after his 
election to the Supreme Court, Shamgar stated that there is “no existing rule 
of international law according to which the Fourth Convention applies in each 
and every armed conflict . . . .”  Shamgar, supra note 112, at 262.  He went on 
to write that application was based on the premise that “there had been a 
sovereign who was ousted and that he had been a legitimate sovereign.”  Id.   
 348. Dweikat v. Government of Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1, 29 (1979), summarized 
in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345 (1979). 
 349. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 43. 
 350. Ayub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113 (1978), summarized in 
English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979). 
 351. Id. 
 352. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 43–44.  
 353. Id. 
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lar provision of the Convention.354  In a minority opinion, Justice 
Haim Cohn found “the seeds of customary international law” 
present in an individual article of the Convention.355 
With respect to the objections to housing demolitions made 
under the Convention, the Court has primary relied on the local 
law doctrine to dodge the issue.356  On the rare occasions that it 
has addressed international law, the Court has simply stated 
that DER 119, as local law in force prior to 1967, remains in 
force.357  It is somewhat ironic, given its ambivalent stand on the 
applicability of the Convention, that the Court has even cited 
Article 64 of the Convention as support for the rather amor-
phous local law doctrine.358 
c. Analysis 
Numerous issues converge when analyzing the application of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza.  
Among these issues are the sovereignty of Egypt and Jordan in 
these territories prior to the occupation, the correct reading of 
Article 2 of the Convention, the possible categorization of the 
Convention as customary international law, and the effects of 
Israel’s voluntary acceptance of the Convention.  An examina-
tion of these issues is necessary for a proper understanding of 
the applicability of the Convention. 
The question of whether the West Bank and Gaza were the 
sovereign territory of Jordan and Egypt, respectively, prior to 
1967 has generated a great deal of discussion.  The issue is an 
interesting one academically, and persuasive arguments can be 
made to support both the affirmative and negative conclusion.  
According to the Israeli Government, this question is the key to 
the application of the Convention under Article 2.359   
  
 354. Id. at 43. 
 355. Qawassmeh v. Minister of Defense, 35(1) P.D. 617, 636 (1980).  The 
issue was raised regarding Article 49 of the Convention, which concerns de-
portations and mass transfers. 
 356. Simon, supra note 46, at 46–48. 
 357. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 94. 
 358. See generally Jabar v. Officer Commanding Central Command, 41(2) 
P.D. 522 (1987), summarized in English in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 252 (1988).  
This, of course, suggests that despite an unwillingness to authoritatively rule 
on the issue, the Court does, in fact, believe the Convention is applicable.   
 359. See infra text accompanying notes 475–77. 
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Professor Blum argued that Jordan never gained sovereignty 
over the territory of the West Bank during its occupation be-
tween 1948 and 1967.360  This argument is based on the fact that 
Jordan and Egypt occupied the West Bank and Gaza, respec-
tively, as a result of aggression.361  Since, sovereignty cannot be 
established through aggressive occupation, neither Jordan nor 
Egypt could claim sovereign rights.362 
Arab governments and certain scholars have denied this the-
ory and argued that sovereignty was, in fact, established.363  
However, such arguments are largely unpersuasive.  Even pro-
ponents of the application of the Convention to the territories 
have concluded that sovereignty was never achieved.364  Thus, 
this determination appears to be correct. 
Emphasis has been placed on the sovereignty question for two 
reasons.  First, the issue is one of great political significance to 
Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Egypt.365  Showing that Jordan 
exercised sovereign control over the West Bank strengthens its 
claim to the region and legitimizes its position vis-à-vis Israel.366  
This posturing, however, has nothing to do with the application 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Second, the question of sovereignty is at the center of the Is-
raeli interpretation of Article 2, as expressed by Meir Shamgar.  
This argument relies on an incorrect reading of the second 
paragraph of the article, which states that the “Convention 
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party.” 367  As discussed above, 
Shamgar read “the territory of a High Contracting Party” to 
mean the sovereign territory of a state.368  As will be demon-
strated, sovereignty is not essential to the application of the 
Convention through Article 2. 
  
 360. See infra text accompanying notes 473–74. 
 361. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 45–46. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See id. at 45–47. 
 364. See id.; Alain Pellet, The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 169, 
174–76 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).  For a thorough discussion of the sover-
eignty issue, see COHEN, supra note 25, at 44–51. 
 365. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 46–48. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 2. 
 368. See supra text accompanying note 347. 
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According to the first paragraph of Article 2, the Convention 
applies “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed con-
flict which may arise between two or more of the High Contract-
ing Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them.”369  Correctly read, the Convention applies at the outbreak 
of hostilities and continues to apply to the territory occupied in 
the course of the conflict for an indefinite period of time.  The 
armed conflict between Israel and Jordan and Egypt in 1967 
gave rise to application of the Convention.  Once applicable, the 
Convention applied to territories occupied by Israel and contin-
ues to apply to this day.370 
This interpretation becomes clear when the drafting history 
of the Convention is examined.  The first paragraph of Article 2 
was meant to trigger the application of the Convention when 
any armed conflict erupted between High Contracting Parties.371  
This definition included all stages of the conflict, including bel-
ligerent occupation.372   
The second paragraph was specifically aimed at situations 
where occupation does not result from armed conflict.373  This 
provision was a direct result of the Nazi occupation of Denmark 
during the Second World War, which did not initially meet with 
armed resistance.374  Thus, the second paragraph is wholly ir-
  
 369. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 2. 
 370. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 44. 
 371. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE 
WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF THE 
CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 8 (1947) [hereinafter 
REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS]. 
 372. See id.; REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE OF 
NATIONAL RED CROSS SOCIETIES FOR THE STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONS FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 15 (1957). 
 373. See REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 371, at 8.  Proponents 
of the government’s interpretation have stated that this reading renders the 
word “even” in the second paragraph meaningless, and that this reading is 
therefore incorrect, “whatever the meaning intended to be conferred on it by 
its draftsmen”; Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli 
Military Government — The Initial Stage, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE 
TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–1980, THE LEGAL ASPECTS 39 (Meir 
Shamgar ed., 1982).  Professor Kretzmer counters by arguing that even if 
application is contingent on the second paragraph, its terms refer to any terri-
tory controlled by a High Contracting Party.  The requirement that this terri-
tory be the sovereign territory of a party has no basis in the Convention or 
international law.  See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34. 
 374. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34. 
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relevant to situations where armed conflict has already taken 
place. 
This interpretation is supported by the official commentary to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, published by the ICRC.  It 
states: 
In case of war being declared or of armed conflict, the Conven-
tion enters into force; the fact that the territory of one or other 
of the belligerents is later occupied in the course of hostilities 
does not in any way affect this; the inhabitants of the occupied 
territory simply become protected persons as they fall into the 
hands of the Occupying Power. 
  The sense in which the [second] paragraph . . . should be 
understood is thus quite clear.  It does not refer to cases in 
which territory is occupied during hostilities; in such cases the 
Convention will have been in force since the outbreak of hos-
tilities . . . .  The paragraph only refers to cases where the oc-
cupation has taken place . . . without hostilities, and makes 
provision for the entry into force of the Convention in those 
particular circumstances.375 
The second paragraph was simply intended to “fill the gap” left 
by paragraph one regarding occupation meeting no armed resis-
tance.376  This understanding of Article 2 comports with the un-
derlying purposes of the Convention, to “first and foremost pro-
tect individuals, and not to serve State interests.”377  This inter-
pretation is consistent with the requirements of the Vienna 
Convention.378  A wealth of scholarly material supports this con-
clusion as well.379 
  
 375. PICTET, supra note 312, at 21. 
 376. Id. at 22. 
 377. Id. at 21. 
 378. “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.”  See Vienna Convention, supra note 298, art. 
31(1).  If the meaning is still ambiguous, further recourse is made to supple-
mental means, including preparatory work.  Id. art. 32. 
 379. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 25, at 51–54; Richard Falk & Burns Wes-
ton, The Relevance of International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in 
the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
129, 138–41 (1991); Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied 
Territory in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 244 (Emma Playfair ed.,1992); 
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34, Roberts, supra note 334, at 47; Simon, supra 
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As an alternate argument, several academics have focused on 
the fact that customary international law is a part of Israeli 
domestic law.380  They submit that the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion may represent customary international law.381  This argu-
ment is not redundant in light of the above conclusion regard-
ing the interpretation of Article 2. Finding the Convention to be 
customary law would not only confirm its applicability, but 
would also provide the added benefit of making it enforceable in 
Israel’s domestic courts. 
The international community has clearly subscribed to the 
theory that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the 
West Bank and Gaza.  The ICRC, the UN General Assembly, 
and the UN Security Council have each stated that the Conven-
tion applies to the territories.382  Even the United States has 
publicly expressed the view that Israel is required to apply the 
Convention.383   
Careful legal analysis reveals that Israel’s interpretation of 
Article 2 is incorrect.  Clearly, the first paragraph of Article 2 
compels application, triggered by Israel’s armed conflict with 
  
note 46, at 1199.  Even Julius Stone appears to concede that the Convention is 
generally applicable to the territories.  See Stone, supra note 25, at 95. 
 380. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31. 
 381. See, e.g., Qupty, supra note 25, at 112; Pellet, supra note 364, at 189; 
PICTET, supra note 312, at 9; R. Yingling & R. Ginnane, The Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 393, 411 (1952).  Others suggest that at least 
some of the articles of the Convention represent customary law.  See Theodor 
Meron, West Bank and Gaza: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the 
Period of Transition, 9 INT’L Y.B. HUM. RTS. 106, 111–12 (1979).  An additional 
argument is made under English common law that laws of war (i.e., humani-
tarian law) is not subject to the conventional/customary law distinction.  
Rather, humanitarian law is enforceable in domestic courts regardless of 
whether it represents customary international law or not.  See Qupty, supra 
note 25, at 114 (quoting Benjamin Rubin, The Adoption of International Con-
ventions by Israel in Israeli Courts, 13 MESPATIEM 210, 211 (1983)).  Another 
alternate argument has been raised based on Israel’s voluntary compliance 
with the humanitarian provisions of the Convention. However, Professor 
Kretzmer sees this argument as less significant, because it would not neces-
sarily allow for enforcement in domestic courts.  See KRETZMER, supra note 6, 
at 41–42. 
 382. See Hussein Hassouna, The Enforcement of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Including Jerusalem, 7 J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 461, 466 (2001). 
 383. See Carroll, supra note 115, at 1201 (citing 61 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
BULL. 76, 77 (1969)). 
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Jordan and Egypt in 1967.  Despite issues of domestic enforce-
ability, application of the Convention places significant restric-
tions on Israel’s continued use of DER 119. 
2.  Individual Articles Regarding House Demolitions 
Having concluded that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies 
to the West Bank and Gaza, the protections afforded by indi-
vidual articles of the Convention become relevant.  Clearly, 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza are “protected persons” 
entitled to full protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention.384  
These protections became effective in 1967 and remain in force 
today.385   
Several articles of the Convention are particularly relevant to 
the issue of housing demolitions.  This subsection will review 
Articles 64, 53, 33, and 71–74 and examine arguments for and 
against their application to this issue.  Analysis of each will re-
veal the effects of its application. 
a. Article 64:  Pre-Occupation Law 
As discussed above, Article 64 deals with the preservation of 
existing law in an occupied territory.  It states, in part, that the 
“penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with 
the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the 
Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its 
security or an obstacle to the application of the present Conven-
tion.”386 Article 64 is significant in analyzing DER 119, as the 
regulation falls into the category of existing law. 
Of course, the Israeli Government denies the applicability of 
the Convention and therefore has no occasion to invoke Article 
64 in support.387  Likewise, the Israeli Supreme Court has relied 
  
 384. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 4.  Possible rare excep-
tions include, for example, an argument that persons who entered the terri-
tory after the occupation did not “find themselves” in the hands of the occupy-
ing power as contemplated by Article 4. 
 385. All of the articles examined in this section remain in force after the 
“one year” provision that limits application of specific other articles to one 
year in certain occupation situations. Id. art. 6.  For a thorough discussion of 
this provision, see Roberts, supra note 334, at 36–39. 
 386. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 64. 
 387. See infra text accompanying notes 476–477. 
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primarily on the “local law doctrine,” although it has cited Arti-
cle 64 in support of the doctrine.388   
Other proponents of the continued use of DER 119, however, 
have relied on Article 64 to prevent application of other articles 
of the Convention that would prohibit the practice.  The argu-
ment, as expressed by Professor Julius Stone, is centered on the 
concept that Article 64 preempts other provisions.389  The state-
ment that existing penal laws should remain in force thus 
“seems even to require continuance of this law.”390  Stone argues 
that Israel has no choice but to maintain DER 119 as valid 
law.391 
Stone also addresses the authorization to repeal the laws con-
tained in Article 64.  First, he emphasizes that the language 
used is permissive; while an occupying power may repeal laws 
contrary to the Convention, but the article “does not oblige him 
to do so.”392  Second, Stone points out that the occupying power 
may repeal laws that threaten its security and finds that “it 
would be very strange indeed to hold that the occupant was for-
bidden to maintain the existing law when this was necessary 
for his security.”393  Finally, he concludes that “the entire prac-
tice of demolitions . . . under the unaltered local law in force is 
legally justifiable under Article 64 . . . .”394 
Stone’s argument is rejected by a number of experts who ar-
gue that existing law that runs contrary to provisions of the 
Convention cannot be maintained pursuant to Article 64.395  
This is plainly stated in the official commentary to the Conven-
tion, written years before the occupation.396  According to this 
expert interpretation, “when the penal legislation of the occu-
pied territory conflicts with the provisions of this Convention, 
the Convention must prevail.”397 
  
 388. See supra text accompanying notes 280, 282, & 285–86. 
 389. Stone, supra note 25, at 96–97. 
 390. Id. at 97. 
 391. Id. at 97. 
 392. Id.  
 393. Id.  
 394. Id. 
 395. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 115, at 1206; Simon, supra note 46, at 48. 
 396. PICTET, supra note 312, at 336. 
 397. Id.   
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The official commentary’s position is the correct one.  The 
purpose of Article 64 is to preserve the laws best suited to the 
occupied population and most familiar to them.398  Moreover, 
this article protects the population from the imposition of op-
pressive criminal laws by the occupying power.399  According to 
delegates to the Geneva Conference, an occupying power 
“should in no circumstances use the criminal law of the Occu-
pied Power as an instrument of oppression.”400  Such an inter-
pretation is in conformity with the object and purpose of the 
Convention.401 
Perhaps a further argument should be added to those levied 
against Stone’s reading of Article 64.  A clear distinction exists 
between the maintenance of a law and the exercise of govern-
ment authority pursuant to that law.  To the extent that Article 
64 can be read as requiring Israel to leave DER 119 in force, it 
does not allow Israel to take actions contrary to other substan-
tive provisions of the Convention in order to enforce that law.402  
The language of DER 119 is permissive: “A Military Com-
mander may” order forfeiture and demolition of a house; he is 
not required to make this order.403  DER 119, thus, creates no 
enforcement obligation on the part of Israeli officials.  If Stone’s 
argument is correct, it simply means that Israel has the option 
to leave DER 119 on the books or to repeal it pursuant to Arti-
cle 64; DER 119 cannot be used as a justification to take action 
that conflicts with other articles of the Convention.  
b. Article 53: Destruction of Property 
The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of 
property by the occupying power in most circumstances.  Article 
53 states: “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or 
personal property belonging individually or collectively to pri-
vate persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to 
  
 398. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 95 
(1957). 
 399. See id. 
 400. 2 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 
670 (1949). 
 401. See supra note 378 (explaining interpretation pursuant to the Vienna 
Convention). 
 402. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 64. 
 403. DER 119, supra note 99. 
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social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations.”404  While the prohibition on destruction of property 
is clear, the exception has proved difficult. 
As Attorney General of Israel, Meir Shamgar argued that 
demolitions pursuant to DER 119 are necessary military opera-
tions.405  He reasoned that houses from which the attacks take 
place are, in effect, military bases and military action is thus 
required.406   
Shamgar’s argument is strengthened by the fact that Israel 
has the prerogative to determine what constitutes military ne-
cessity.  According to the official commentary, “it will be for the 
Occupying Power to judge the importance of such military re-
quirements.”407  Although the exception must be used in a “rea-
sonable manner,” authorities are asked to do so by keeping the 
damage proportionate to the advantage gained.408   
Great discretion is therefore placed in the hands of the occu-
pying power.  Israel is empowered to state that demolitions are 
necessary and proportionate.  The government argues that the 
demolition of “a few dozen homes of proven terrorists” is propor-
tionate to the benefit of the “thousands of innocent lives” that 
have been preserved.409   
Opponents of the policy claim that this argument is flawed.  
They assert that military necessity cannot be claimed days or 
weeks after an offense has occurred.410  They also rely on the 
ICRC interpretation that the exception is limited to measures 
“taken . . . . with a view to fighting.”411  Finally, opponents argue 
that the tension between the prohibition and the exception 
should be resolved in favor of the former.412 
  
 404. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 53. 
 405. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 147. 
 406. See Shamgar, supra note 112, at 176. 
 407. PICTET, supra note 312, at 302. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Carroll, supra note 115, at 1208 (quoting ISRAEL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, 
THE ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION IN JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND GAZA — A RECORD OF 
PROGRESS 7 (1968)). 
 410. See Simon, supra note 46, at 69. 
 411. RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 155 
(1985) (quoting an interpretation by Jacques Moreillon, Director of the ICRC 
Department of Principles and Law, dated Nov. 25, 1981). 
 412. See Simon, supra note 46, at 66. 
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The discretion placed in the hands of the occupying power by 
Article 53 is problematic.  Certainly, many people would agree 
that demolitions are not a military necessity.  Unfortunately, so 
long as the occupying power is authorized to make that deter-
mination, the legal argument that demolitions violate Article 53 
will be difficult to make.  Although Article 53 offers limited re-
strictions on Israel’s actions, this article is not the strongest 
provision from which to challenge demolitions.  
c. Article 33: Individual Responsibility 
The provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention that most 
strongly prohibits the use of housing demolitions as a punitive 
measure is Article 33.  It states that “[n]o protected person may 
be punished for an offense he or she has not personally commit-
ted. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimida-
tion or of terrorism are prohibited.”413  This article also prohibits 
reprisals.414 
In the early stages of the occupation, supporters of DER 119 
denied that it imposed non-individual punishment.415  They con-
tended that demolitions were “never carried out as a collective 
punishment, but only and solely as a punishment of the indi-
vidual involved.”416  The assertion was that procedures existed to 
determine guilt before demolition.417  
Proponents subsequently focused on the involvement of other 
occupants.  They claimed that demolitions only occurred when 
other occupants of the house were implicated in the offense.418  
This theory was based on the widely held assumption that it 
was “highly unlikely that premises would be in use for terrorist 
activities without the owner being in fact implicated.”419  
The Israeli Supreme Court has contributed to this discourse 
as well.  Although not addressing Article 33 in particular, the 
  
 413. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 33. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Colonel Dov Shefi, The Protection of Human Rights in Areas Adminis-
tered by Israel — United Nations Findings and Reality, 3 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
337, 346 (1973). 
 416. Id. 
 417. See Stone, supra note 25, at 96. 
 418. See Simon, supra note 46, at 58–59. 
 419. Stone, supra note 25, at 96.  This view was also subscribed to by Pro-
fessor Dershowitz.  See Simon, supra note 46, at 58.  
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Court has considered challenges to collective punishment under 
Israeli administrative law.420  The Court has consistently denied 
that DER 119 imposes collective punishment, suggesting that 
the effects of demolition on family members are no more serious 
than if the head of household, who supports the family, was ar-
rested.421 
The Court also reasoned that demolitions pursuant to DER 
119 are not punitive.422  Rather, the Court has held that the 
purpose of demolitions is deterrence.423  For example, in Nazal v. 
Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region,424 the Court 
stated that the purpose of applying DER 119 was “to deter po-
tential terrorists from carrying out their murderous acts . . . .”425  
Thus, there is no punishment.  
Essentially, these arguments can be summarized into three 
groups.  The first, now essentially abandoned, is that housing 
demolitions were only carried out against individual perpetra-
tors of violent crimes and never against other occupants, or that 
the effects on others are incidental.  The second argument is 
that the demolitions punishment is only used when family 
members of offenders were aware of, and involved in the of-
fense.  Finally, the Israeli Supreme Court asserts that demoli-
tions are not punishment, but are solely a deterrent measure.426 
Beginning with the Israeli Supreme Court’s deterrence the-
ory, if demolitions are not punishment, then they truly do not 
fall within the purview of Article 33.427  While logically appeal-
ing to suggest that the purpose of demolitions is deterrence this 
argument is based on the assumption that measures be de-
signed to have either punitive or deterrent effects.428  This incor-
rect assumption has no foundation in basic theories of criminal 
  
 420. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 149. 
 421. See generally Dagalis et al. v. Military Commander of the Judea and 
Samaria Region, 40(2) P.D. 42 (1985), summarized in English in 17 ISR. Y.B. 
HUM. RTS. 315 (1987). 
 422. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 151–52.  
 423. See id. 
 424. Nazal v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria region, 42(3) P.D. 641, 
(1994), summarized in English in 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 376 (1989). 
 425. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 152 (quoting the Nazaal opinion). 
 426. Id. 
 427. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 33 (Article 33 only 
prohibits punishment of protected persons). 
 428. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 152. 
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justice.  Quite simply, deterrence and punishment are insepa-
rable.  One of the primary goals of punishment is to deter 
criminal behavior in the future.429  This is achieved through two 
means: general deterrence, which is aimed at the population as 
a whole; and, individual deterrence, which is intended to pre-
vent the offender from repeating his or her behavior.430  Both of 
these methods are achieved by imposing punishment.   
Pursuant to DER 119, housing demolitions have all of the 
elements required for classification of an act as punishment.431  
Demolitions are a form of punishment historically employed by 
the British Empire in South Africa and Ireland.432  House demo-
litions pursuant to DER 119 are clearly punitive and, as a re-
sult, are a method of punishment as contemplated by Article 33. 
The argument that demolitions were carried out only against 
individuals has been abandoned with good reason.  While per-
suasive in the early days of the occupation, this argument is 
clearly refuted by the facts.  Between May 1985 and early 1987 
alone, every demolition carried out by Israeli forces left between 
2 and 25 people homeless in addition to the offenders.433   
The effects of demolition on families are certainly not inciden-
tal to the punishment of the individual.  Comparisons of the 
effects of demolitions on suspects’ families with those effects 
suffered when the families’ breadwinner is imprisoned are 
flawed.  As Professor David Kretzmer notes, the aim of impris-
onment is not frustrated if the prisoner’s family is not adversely 
affected, as the main goal is incapacitation and reform of the 
prisoner.434  The purpose of demolitions, on the other hand, can-
not be accomplished without adversely affecting all other occu-
pants of the house.  Imposing suffering and hardship on these 
other occupants is a direct, not incidental, part of the punish-
  
 429. See Kent Greenwalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 1340 (Sanford Kadish ed., 1983). 
 430. Id. at 1340–41. 
 431. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 152. In its early demolition opinions, 
the Israeli Supreme Court routinely referred to the measure as punitive.  Id. 
at 151. 
 432. See id. at 237 n.56.  
 433. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 14. 
 434. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 150–51.  See also PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, 
supra note 19, at 14–15. 
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ment.  The fact that demolitions have been carried out after the 
offender has been killed proves this fact.435   
The argument that the suffering of family members is an un-
fortunate side effect is further weakened by the fact that few 
demolished homes are owned by offenders.436  Rather, family 
members or third parties own the houses.  Therefore, others are 
not incidentally affected by destruction of the offender’s house.  
Realistically the party penalized, most directly is the owner of 
the building. 
The remaining argument is that demolitions are only used 
when the other occupants were aware of or participated in the 
offense.  This argument is likewise refuted by the facts.  There 
is no basis in the suggestion that each resident of the demol-
ished houses were somehow implicated in the offense, since Is-
raeli forces routinely carried out demolitions without first con-
tacting other occupants.437  Israeli authorities have not exam-
ined the participation of other occupants prior to demolition, 
nor does it even accuse them of involvement.438  Even the Israeli 
Supreme Court admitted that authorities need not have evi-
dence that other occupants had knowledge of the offense as this 
“does not flow from the text of the regulation.”439     
Each of these arguments denying that demolitions violate Ar-
ticle 33 fails on its own terms.  On the other hand, arguments in 
favor of the position are soundly founded and have far reaching 
support in the international community and legal circles.  These 
arguments will now be explored. 
The official commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention 
clearly describes the nature of Article 33.  It begins by stating 
that “penal liability is personal in character.”440  This assertion 
refers not just to formal punishments under penal law, but also 
to “penalties of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups of 
persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of hu-
manity, for acts that these persons have not committed.”441  
  
 435. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3.  
 436. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 150–51. 
 437. See Simon, supra note 46, at 59. 
 438. See id. at 59.  
 439. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 154 (quoting Alzak v. Military Com-
mander of West Bank, 1987(1) Takdin-Elyon 1). 
 440. PICTET, supra note 312, at 225. 
 441. Id. 
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Additionally, the commentary refers to the companion provi-
sion of the Hague Regulations, Article 50.442  It is noted that the 
terms of Article 50 might arguably allow for some community 
responsibility.443  However, this is clearly not the case with Arti-
cle 33 where “[r]esponsibility is personal and it will no longer be 
possible to inflict penalties on persons who have themselves not 
committed the acts complained of.”444 
Demolitions pursuant to DER 119 clearly run contrary to the 
commentary’s position, which was adopted years before the oc-
cupation.445  There is no doubt that the ICRC agrees with this 
theory.  In 1968, the ICRC reported that it had repeatedly con-
tacted Israel to ask the government “to cease these practices 
which are contrary to article[] 33 . . . of the IVth Geneva Con-
vention and to ask for the reconstruction of damaged houses or 
for financial compensation to be paid.”446 
The position of the commentary is well-founded.  Under Arti-
cle 33, authorities cannot impose penalties on individuals not 
responsible for an offense.447  This position comports with the 
object and purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  
Demolitions almost always violate Article 33 of the Conven-
tion because they are collective by nature.  The outcome would 
only be different if the offender was the owner of the house and 
was also the only occupant.  As soon as another individual is 
not wholly culpable for the offense is affected, Article 33 be-
comes applicable. 
Statistical data and individual case studies support the con-
clusion that Article 33 has been repeatedly violated by Israel.  
Data collected by the non-governmental organization al-Haq 
reveals that over a ten-year period, only 8.4% of homes demol-
ished pursuant to DER 119 belonged to the offenders.448  There-
fore, in well over 93% of cases the brunt of the punishment fell 
on the non-offending owner.   
  
 442. Id. 
 443. See Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 50. 
 444. PICTET, supra note 312, at 225. 
 445. The Commentary was published in 1958. 
 446. SHEHADEH, supra note 411, at 154 (citing a 1968 report of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross). 
 447. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, arts. 71–74. 
 448. See text accompanying note 159. 
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Individual cases reveal similar trends.  Houses are demol-
ished without notice and without any inquiry into the involve-
ment or knowledge of other occupants.449  Ownership of the 
house is not established by authorities.450  Demolitions are car-
ried out despite the fact that the alleged offender has died.451  
All of these cases demonstrate that the Israeli government 
practices collective punishment with little regard for other oc-
cupants of the houses.   
Most convincing is the empirical evidence compiled from find-
ings of fact made by Israeli Supreme Court.  Out of 145 houses 
demolished, only 7 (4.8% of the total), were confirmed to have 
been owned by the offender.452  At least 100 of these houses (69% 
of the total) belonged to someone other than the offender.453  
Thus in at least 69% of these cases, demolitions have penalized 
the owner of the house.  In an even higher percentage, other 
occupants of the house are also penalized.   These demolitions 
have been carried out in direct violation of Article 33 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.   
d. Articles 71–74: Fair Trial 
Clearly housing demolitions are a form of punishment.454  
Demolitions are imposed pursuant to DER 119 when an accused 
has illegally discharged a weapon or explosive device or com-
mitted an offense against the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 
of 1945.455  It follows that DER 119, although termed an admin-
istrative procedure, has the characteristics of a penal law.  
Thus, the argument can be made that persons subjected to DER 
119 should receive the protections afforded to a criminal defen-
dant. 
The right to a fair trial is “a fundamental notion of justice as 
it is understood in all civilized countries.”456  These protections 
  
 449. See SHEHADEH, supra note 282, at 154–56.   
 450. See Simon, supra note 46, at 59 n.315. 
 451. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 15. 
 452. See Figure 2 accompanying note 220. 
 453. See id.  Ownership of thirty-eight houses was not determined.  Id. 
 454. See infra text accompanying notes 429–33. 
 455. See supra Part III.A. 
 456. Simon, supra note 46, at 74.  See also Fourth Geneva Convention, su-
pra note 39, arts. 71–74. 
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are widely considered to be general principles of law,457 and their 
application should not be sacrificed to issues of terminology.   
Fair trials are governed by Articles 71 through 74 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.458  Most importantly the first sen-
tence of Article 71 states: “No sentence shall be pronounced by 
the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a 
regular trial.”459  This provision contains two important safe-
guards.  First, persons accused of crimes are entitled to a trial.  
Second, the trial must be conducted by a court of the occupying 
power.  According to the commentary, this “safeguard is abso-
lutely general.”460 
The basic requirements for fair trials are set forth in Article 
72.  Among these are the right to counsel, the right to present 
evidence and witnesses, and the right to an interpreter.461  Addi-
tionally, Article 73 guarantees the right to appeal.462 
C. Enforcement 
The Fourth Geneva Convention is not enforceable in Israeli 
courts, despite its applicability to the West Bank and Gaza.463  
Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the Israeli Supreme Court 
would accept the view that Articles 71–74 represent general 
principles of law.464  Even if these articles were enforceable, the 
Court could quite possibly deny that DER 119 is a penal law.465  
In any event, the climate in Israel’s domestic system has gener-
ally been a conservative one and that the Court would embrace 
such a novel concept is unlikely. 
However, the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) on July 1, 2002, marks a new era in the enforce-
  
 457. See MERON, supra note 293, at 49-50; Simon, supra note 43, at 73–74; 
Stone, supra note 23, at 96.  See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights 
in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Pro-
tections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 235 (1993). 
 458. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, arts. 71–74. 
 459. Id. art. 71. 
 460. PICTET, supra note 312, at 354. 
 461. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art 72. 
 462. See id. art. 73. 
 463. See supra Part V.B.1.c. 
 464. See supra text accompanying note 457 (discussing acceptance of Arti-
cles 71–74 as general principles of international law).  
 465. See supra Part II.C. 
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ment of international humanitarian law.466  The ICC does not 
provide a forum for individuals to challenge measures that they 
believe violate humanitarian law, in the style of Israel’s High 
Court of Justice.  Rather, the ICC prosecutes persons responsi-
ble for violations of the law.467   
The jurisdiction of the ICC is narrowly focused on four 
crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
crime of aggression.468  The category entitled war crimes in-
cludes grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  
Among these breaches are the “extensive destruction and ap-
propriation of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly,”469 which corresponds to 
Article 53,470 and “depriving a . . . protected person of the rights 
of a fair and regular trial,”471 which corresponds to Articles 71–
74.472  The list of violations is exclusive; thus non-individual 
punishment as prohibited by Article 33 is not included. 
As discussed above, violations of Article 53 are somewhat dif-
ficult to prove, since the determination of what constitutes mili-
tary necessity is left to the occupying power.  Violations of the 
fair trial provision, on the other hand, are much easier to prove 
as falling under the ICC statute.  The only significant obstacle 
is demonstrating that demolitions are form of punishment and 
that as such DER 119 is a criminal or quasi-criminal law re-
quiring fair trial protections.  Although difficult, this obstacle 
can be overcome.   
Jurisdiction is the real challenge in using the ICC to prose-
cute violations of Articles 71–74 in the West Bank and Gaza.  
The Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction only “with the 
consent of those who will themselves be subject to its jurisdic-
tion.”473  Jurisdiction can be exercised over crimes taking place 
  
 466. Ewen MacAskill & Oliver Burkeman, New Court Makes Global Justice 
a Reality, GUARDIAN, April 11, 2002, at 17. 
 467. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 
art. 5, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 137 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 
2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 468. See id. 
 469. Id.at art. 8(2)(a)(iv). 
 470. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 53. 
 471. Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(vi). 
 472. Id. at arts. 71–74. 
 473. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 54 (2001). 
File: FARRELL Base MacroFinal.doc Created on:  6/14/2003 3:03 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:23 PM 
934 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
in the territory of a state party to the ICC or crimes committed 
by a national of a state party.474 
Israel has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“Statute”).  Although it signed the Statute on 
December 31, 2000, indicating its intention to ratify, Israel fol-
lowed the example of the United States and, on August 28, 
2002, informed the Secretary-General of the UN that it was 
“unsigning” the Statute.475  Nor has Egypt ratified the Statute.476 
Interestingly, Jordan is a state party to the ICC, having rati-
fied the Rome Statute on April 11, 2002.477  It follows that Jor-
danian claims to the territory of the West Bank arguably gives 
rise to the jurisdiction of the ICC.  Jordan’s claim is certainly 
tenuous as many scholars contend that Jordan never achieved 
sovereignty over the territory between 1948 and 1967.478  Never-
theless, the basis for this territorial claim exists. 
An even more intriguing possibility exists.  As an accepted 
principle of international law, belligerent communities “may 
enter into legal relations and conclude agreements valid on the 
international plane . . . .”479  The Palestinian Authority certainly 
has a unique status in the international community.  What 
would be the effect of ratification of the Rome Statute by an 
elected representative of the Palestinian people? 
These two possibilities are, of course, speculative.  Legal ex-
perts will no doubt express their opinions on the subject, as will 
the various parties.  Still, this jurisdictional question would not 
be decided by the Israeli Supreme Court or left to the halls of 
  
 474. See Rome Statute, supra note 467, art. 12(2). 
 475. The text of the communication read as follows: 
[I]n connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court adopted on 17 July 1998. . . . Israel does not intend to become a 
party to the treaty.  Accordingly, Israel has no legal obligations aris-
ing from its signature on 31 December 2000. Israel requests that its 
intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be re-
flected in the depositary's status lists relating to this treaty. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court — Participants, Notes, ¶3, 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/ bible/englishinternetbible 
/PartI/chapter XVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited May 21, 2003).  
 476. Id. 
 477. Id. 
 478. See supra text accompanying notes 327–35, 360–364.  
 479. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (4th ed. 
1990). 
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universities. Instead, this question it would be raised in, argued 
before, and ruled on by a new independent international court.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Israel has used house demolitions as a punitive measure in 
the West Bank and Gaza since 1967.  This measure, ostensibly 
rooted in the law of the Mandate period, is increasingly used in 
response to security concerns in Israel.  Clearly, the Israeli 
Government views house demolitions as an effective measure. 
Demolitions invariably affect all occupants of a house, not 
just the alleged offender.  Only in rare cases does the house be-
long to the offender, and in most cases, a number of people 
share the subject house.  These other occupants are usually not 
accused of participation in the offense, and no attempt is made 
to determine their culpability before demolition occurs.  Fur-
thermore demolitions have occurred in a number of cases after 
the death of the offender. 
This demolition practice runs contrary to standards of inter-
national law.  It has been demonstrated that international hu-
man rights law is applicable to the West Bank and Gaza.480  Pu-
nitive demolitions violate human rights protection against in-
human punishment, a proposition supported by the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights.481 
The “local law doctrine” by which Israel has sheltered DER 
119 from substantive humanitarian law is unsustainable.  The 
doctrine is based on a mistaken reliance on the primacy of pre-
existing law over substantive international law.482  Thus, puni-
tive demolitions must be subjected to the full scrutiny of the 
Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Additionally, the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion to the West Bank and Gaza is undeniable.  An analysis of 
Article 2 reveals that the Convention is applicable in its en-
tirety to the territories.  The oft-used “sovereignty” argument is 
irrelevant to application, which properly turns on the fact that 
Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in the course of an 
armed conflict.  The mistaken view that Article 64 obliges Israel 
  
 480. See supra Part IV (discussing international human rights law). 
 481. See, e.g., Selçuk & Asker v. Turkey, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 477. 
 482. See supra Part V.B.2.a. 
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to enforce DER 119 in violation of substantive international law 
has also been dismissed. 
Despite the denial that demolitions violate Article 33 of the 
Convention, this fact has been well demonstrated.  Demolitions 
are unmistakably collective and penal by nature.  The manner 
in which Israel has enforced DER 119 since 1967 clearly estab-
lishes its non-individual character.  The language of Article 33 
and the official commentary on this article confirm the conclu-
sion that Israel’s use of housing demolitions is illegal.  Likewise, 
the process laid out by DER 119 is offensive to the fair trial 
provisions of the Convention.  Punitive demolitions are imposed 
outside the judicial system without hearing.  Procedural safe-
guards are completely absent. 
Israel’s use of demolitions pursuant to DER 119 must end.  It 
clearly violates provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
other principles of international law.  The Israeli Government, 
Israel’s courts, and the international community must all re-
solve to abolish a practice that has blemished Israel’s standing 
among democratic nations. 
 
